The Institutional Design of Punishment by Rappaport, Aaron J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2018
The Institutional Design of Punishment
Aaron J. Rappaport
UC Hastings College of the Law, rappapor@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aaron J. Rappaport, The Institutional Design of Punishment, 60 Ariz. L. Rev. 913 (2018).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1690
THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF 
PUNISHMENT 
Aaron Rappaport* 
For the past 40 years, policymakers have engaged in a debate over which institution 
should wield the principal power over punishment. Should courts and parole boards 
have the dominant role at sentencing, or should that power be left to legislatures 
and sentencing commissions? These debates are typically couched in policy terms, 
yet they also raise deeply philosophical questions. Among the most notable is a 
normative one: what is the morally justified sentencing system?   
Perhaps surprisingly, criminal theorists have almost uniformly ignored this 
normative question, and that neglect has degraded the quality of the ongoing 
institutional debates. This Paper seeks to address that shortcoming by exploring the 
moral ramifications of design choices in the sentencing field. In particular, this 
Paper identifies the institutional structure best suited for promoting utilitarianism, 
a widely accepted moral theory of punishment. 
Drawing insights from cognitive science and institutional analysis, this Paper 
concludes that a properly structured sentencing commission is the institution best 
able to satisfy the moral theory’s demands. Beyond that policy prescription, this 
Paper has a broader set of goals: to start a conversation about the link between 
moral theory and institutional design, and to encourage policymakers to more fully 
explore the premises of their own institutional choices in the criminal justice field. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 40 years, the United States has experienced an extraordinary 
transformation in the institutional design of its punishment systems. Many states, 
along with the federal government, have shifted from indeterminate sentencing 
models—in which courts and parole boards wield principal authority—to 
determinate systems—in which legislators and sentencing commissions have 
principal power.1 This shift has been called one of the most important changes in 
federal judging in the last half-century or more.2 It has also been cited as a key factor 
in the dramatic increase in incarceration since the early 1980s.3 
The institutional change has not occurred without controversy. From the 
start, critics have questioned whether legislatures and sentencing commissions are 
                                                                                                            
             1.  See generally Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment is Enough?: 
Embracing Uncertainty  in Modern Sentencing Reform, 24 J.L. & POL'Y 345, 354–81 (2016) 
(discussing institutional shift); Samuel Pillsbury, Understanding Penal Reform: The 
Dynamic of Change, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 759–65 (1989) (same). This 
general transformation is touched on further in Section I.B, infra. 
 2. Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y. L.J., 
Feb. 11, 1992, at 2 (“[T]he Guidelines system is probably the most significant development 
in ‘judging’ in the federal judicial system since the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.”). 
 3. See, e.g., STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY 
AMERICANS IN PRISON 97–113 (2013) (arguing that mass incarceration is due to tough-on-
crime policies, including determinate sentencing). 
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appropriate punishment institutions and whether the structural changes will lead to 
a more fair and effective criminal justice system.4 That debate continues to this day. 
In the last few years alone, several jurisdictions have considered ways to reverse the 
pendulum’s course and return sentencing power to courts and parole boards.5 
Pushing back, influential organizations—such as the American Law Institute—have 
argued for a renewed commitment to elements of the determinate sentencing model.6 
The policy debate, in short, has been vigorous and remains so. Yet, notably 
lacking from the discussion has been any effort to examine the institutional design 
of punishment from a theoretical point of view; that is, to explore the underlying 
morality of different institutional schemes.7 Criminal theorists, of course, have not 
ignored questions of moral justification; they often seem obsessed with such 
questions.8 But much of that theoretical work has focused on foundational moral 
questions, such as the endless debate about which moral theory—utilitarianism, 
retribution, or some hybrid of the two—should govern sentencing decisions. To the 
extent that theorists have taken a more “applied” approach, their focus has been on 
specific sanctions—e.g., is the death penalty justified?—on criminal doctrine—e.g., 
what justifies the rules of self-defense?—and on certain crimes—e.g., are current 
penalties for felony murder justified?9 Rarely do theorists ask the question: what 
justifies choosing one institutional structure of punishment over another? 
                                                                                                            
 4. See, e.g., LOIS FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
OF MANDATORY SENTENCING (1994) (sharply criticizing movement toward mandatory 
penalties); Terence Dunworth & Charles Weiselberg, Felony Cases and The Federal Courts: 
The Guidelines Experience, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 99, 101 (1992) (federal guidelines “have been 
the focus of a fury of criticism from judges, lawyers, and scholars”). 
 5. One notable example is California, which has enacted several reforms in recent 
years that give judges more authority to release major categories of offenders from prison. 
See, e.g., Assemb. B. 109, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). In 2016, the State also 
increased the authority of parole boards to release nonviolent offenders before they serve their 
full terms. Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. See also Fiona 
Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 958, 960 (2013) (discussing analogous changes to federal system). 
 6. In its recently enacted proposal for a model code of sentencing, the American 
Law Institute endorsed the use of sentencing commissions—a pillar of the determinate 
sentencing model. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final 
Draft 2017). 
 7. This neglect is consistent with the general lack of attention given to 
institutional issues in normative philosophy. See JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL 
THEORY 3–4 (2016) (bemoaning the dearth of careful theoretical work about government 
institutions). 
 8. See generally Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (last visited July 21, 2018) (“The central 
question asked by philosophers of punishment is: What can justify punishment?”). 
 9. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 6–8 (2009) (exploring ramifications of retribution 
for criminal doctrines, such as omission liability and inchoate crimes); Guyora Binder, The 
Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 967 (2008) (discussing moral 
justifications for felony-murder doctrine); Carol Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not 
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This neglect is problematic in the sentencing field. Institutional choices 
have profound implications for the punitiveness of the criminal justice system. 
Different sentencing institutions have different biases, leading to different 
sentencing outcomes.10 It simply matters whether punishment decisions are 
controlled by judges, juries, legislatures, commissions, or parole boards. Careful 
empirical work can help identify these institutional biases, but philosophical 
analysis is needed to illuminate the deeper moral implications of the design choices. 
Even more importantly, this is an area where casual intuition is a poor guide 
for decision-making. Criminal justice policy evokes strong emotions, which make it 
hard to think through policy questions in a reasoned and principled manner. Deeper 
assumptions about the moral and political effects of institutional design can be 
obscured by emotions—by the fear of crime or by worries about government 
overreach. This is not to say that concerns about public safety or individual liberty 
should be ignored, only that assessing their significance and determining how to 
balance these factors requires hard philosophical reflection. 
In short, the absence of systematic work by moral theorists degrades the 
quality of ongoing policy debates. It increases the risk that policies will be adopted 
with unintended consequences or uncertain justifications. To help redress this 
problem, this Paper offers what I believe is the first sustained attempt to explore the 
relationship between moral theory and institutional design in the punishment field. 
It yields not only a specific policy prescription but also a general framework for 
assessing the moral ramifications of institutional-design choices. 
The effort is admittedly preliminary and partial, primarily because of two 
daunting impediments facing any theoretical effort. The first is the lack of agreement 
over the appropriate moral theory governing punishment decisions. Two moral 
theories dominate the field—utilitarianism and retribution—along with hybrid 
versions that meld the two.11 The choice among these moral theories has proved 
endlessly controversial, and no accepted methodology exists to resolve the dispute. 
The controversy over moral premises need not be an insuperable obstacle, 
however. Rather than trying to identify the “correct” moral principle, an alternative 
approach would be to assess the institutional ramifications of each moral theory in 
turn. The result would be a menu of design options, each associated with a different 
moral principle. This approach would confront retributivists and utilitarians, in turn, 
with the institutional ramifications of their favored moral outlook. In adopting this 
approach, the current Paper takes the first step, exploring the institutional 
                                                                                                            
Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty,” 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 
752 (2005) (criticizing moral justifications for the death penalty). 
  The publication of the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law 
offers an illustration of this phenomenon. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW, at ix–x (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds. 2011). That survey of criminal 
philosophy touches on a range of topics, including theoretical topics relating to types of 
crimes, defenses, doctrinal elements, and sanctions. See id. None of the 17 chapters, however, 
offers a sustained treatment of the moral justifications for the institutional structure of the 
criminal justice system. See id. 
 10. Several such institutional features are discussed in Part III, infra. 
 11. See generally Duff, supra note 8. 
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ramifications of one dominant principle of punishment—utilitarianism. The hope is 
that the effort will inspire others to examine the institutional implications of other 
moral theories in the punishment field. 
A second obstacle cannot be so easily evaded. To determine which 
institution is most likely to promote utilitarian goals, a theorist must make a range 
of assumptions about how different sentencing institutions operate in practice. 
Reliable empirical support for these assumptions will not always exist, so at times, 
anecdote and judgment must be relied upon. This means that the assumptions are 
often tentative and controversial. The contingent nature of the claims may 
discourage theorists from even attempting to develop institutional arguments. 
This would be a mistake. Any debate about institutional design in the 
punishment field—including policy debates today—inevitably turns on just these 
kinds of empirical assumptions. Typically, these assumptions are hidden from view, 
impeding open debate and obscuring areas in need of further study. We can improve 
policy deliberation and debate by being explicit about these assumptions and their 
relationships to preferred moral goals. Thus, the bulk of this Paper is an attempt to 
articulate and defend the core empirical assumptions driving the ultimate policy 
prescription. Though some of these claims will be controversial, I believe that they 
are, at the very least, plausible in nature and will offer a productive starting point for 
further discussion and research. 
The ultimate analysis, in short, draws a link between utilitarianism and 
institutional design choices in the sentencing field. In doing so, it highlights which 
institutional structures have the best chance of promoting utilitarian goals. The 
analysis ultimately suggests that none of the traditional sentencing institutions—the 
legislature, jury, judiciary, parole board, or sentencing commission—possess the 
full range of skills needed to effectively carry out the utilitarian calculus. 
Nonetheless, the study indicates that one option is far superior to the rest: the 
sentencing commission model. The theoretical analysis thus yields a concrete policy 
prescription. 
This is a significant and perhaps surprising result. It represents the first 
theoretical justification for sentencing commissions in the criminal justice field.12 
Though numerous commentators have supported the commission approach—
including, more recently, the American Law Institute—virtually all have relied on a 
hodgepodge of policy arguments. None have presented a cohesive normative 
                                                                                                            
 12. Franklin Zimring and his co-authors have commented on the growing 
popularity of sentencing commissions, despite their lack of a clearly articulated grounding. 
As they write, 
What makes this particularly interesting is the lack of any justifying 
ideology to support the legitimacy of sentencing commissions. Parole 
boards were supported by an ideology of rehabilitation and prediction of 
dangerousness, but the sentencing commission is a nakedly pragmatic 
institution with an expertise that is not linked to any larger theory of 
criminal punishment. 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY 213 
(2001) (citation omitted). 
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justification, rooted in moral principle, for the institutional structure. This analysis, 
in other words, directly contributes to the ongoing institutional debate in the 
sentencing field. 
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
For the utilitarian, institutions are instrumental: they are valued to the 
extent that they promote the moral goal of maximizing utility. Theorists, of course, 
adopt different interpretations of “utility.” Some view it as a subjective experience—
e.g., the experience of happiness—others view it as a more objective idea of well-
being—e.g., the actualization of inherent talents.13 In this Paper, I will adopt the 
former, more traditional approach, which is often called “hedonistic” 
utilitarianism.14 
Equating utility with happiness clarifies the goal of any sentencing 
decision: a morally justified sentence is one in which the amount of happiness in 
society is maximized over the long run. This is a future-oriented assessment.15 It 
requires the decision-maker to evaluate the future consequences of any punishment 
decision for human happiness. In this sense, utilitarianism is typically classified as 
a type of “consequentialist” moral theory.16 
Invariably, a punishment decision will both increase the happiness of some 
and decrease the happiness of others. For example, punishment may ultimately 
reduce the amount of crime in a community (and thereby increase future happiness). 
At the same time, it may cause certain individuals to suffer—most obviously, the 
offender himself. Thus, in assessing which punishment is justified, the sentencing 
institution must weigh the costs and benefits of various punishment options.17 
Ultimately, a justified sentence is one in which the benefits of the 
punishment outweigh the costs; the most justified sentence is the one that does this 
to the greatest degree. Making this assessment is extremely challenging because 
punishment decisions have such wide-ranging and hard-to-measure effects on 
                                                                                                            
 13. See ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 13 (1995) 
(discussing different interpretations of “utility”). 
 14. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ (last visited July 17, 2018) (“Classic 
utilitarians held hedonistic act consequentialism.”). 
 15. Utilitarianism might be contrasted with backward-looking theories, such as 
retribution. The latter is concerned with the inherent culpability of an individual for past acts. 
For the utilitarian, in contrast, issues of moral culpability are not directly relevant. 
 16. See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 14 (“The paradigm case of 
consequentialism is utilitarianism.”). 
 17. The focus of this Paper is on identifying the sentencing institution best able to 
identify the optimal punishment within a utilitarian framework. However, it is important to 
recognize that, from a broader utilitarian perspective, punishment decisions are only one of 
several levers government has for increasing social welfare. For example, attempts to address 
the root causes of crime—through improved education, job training, and other programs—
are alternative mechanisms for dealing with criminal activity, and their costs and benefits 
would ideally be considered as well. Ultimately, the goal should be to identify the best option 
in any given situation—the option with the greatest net benefit. 
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society and its citizens. Nonetheless, the overarching goal is clear in principle, if not 
always in practice: the decision-maker should maximize net benefits, measured in 
terms of subjective feelings of happiness. 
A. Two Principles of Institutional Design 
With the moral goal established, the institutional challenge follows 
naturally. The designer must identify a sentencing structure that is best able to carry 
out the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. Such an institution must, at a minimum, 
possess two essential qualities. First, it must be committed to promoting utilitarian 
goals. Second, it must be capable of carrying out the relevant analysis consistently 
and competently over time.18 
Commitment to the utilitarian enterprise is a critical requirement. An 
institution that fails to adopt the moral principle of utilitarianism, and thus embraces 
theories such as retribution, will be utility-maximizing only by accident. Thus, the 
institutional designer must consider whether an entity’s structure might influence its 
choice of moral goals. This idea—that institutional structure can affect goal 
selection—might seem surprising. But as we shall see, recent research in moral 
psychology identifies structural features that tend to encourage the adoption of a 
utilitarian orientation.19 
Commitment to utilitarian goals, of course, is not alone sufficient. An 
institution will attain those goals only if it is also capable of carrying out the cost-
benefit analysis consistently and accurately over time. The institutional designer, 
thus, must also consider the kinds of institutional competences necessary to 
effectively carry out the analysis. As later Sections explain, a fully competent 
institution will need a diversity of skills, including technical expertise, a degree of 
impartiality, and an expansive sense of empathy.20 
This is an unusual set of competences to find in any institution, and one 
might doubt that a sentencing body could possess all sufficiently. Those doubts 
cannot be easily dismissed, nor should they be. In the real world, as Neil Komesar 
has repeatedly noted, every institution is imperfect to one degree or another.21 Thus, 
perfection is not, and cannot be, the standard for making institutional choices. 
Rather, the goal must be to identify the best institution out of a range of imperfect 
options—that is, to choose the “least imperfect” alternative.22 
                                                                                                            
 18. To keep the analysis manageable, this Paper does not discuss several other 
factors that might also be relevant in a comprehensive utilitarian analysis. For example, the 
relevance of disparities at sentencing are not addressed, even though these kinds of 
inequalities may have utilitarian implications. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 5 (1997). 
 22. Neil Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A 
Comparative Institutional Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1350 (1981). 
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B. Five Traditional Institutions of Punishment 
Ideally, the search for the least imperfect sentencing system would survey 
all possible structures. In practice, this would be impractical. Thus, to keep the 
discussion manageable, this Paper limits its focus to five traditional sentencing 
institutions: the jury, judiciary, parole board, legislature, and sentencing 
commission.23 
Over the past century, these five institutions have all been employed in 
criminal sentencing to some degree. Jury sentencing is probably the least commonly 
used of the group. At its heyday in the early part of the 20th century, roughly a dozen 
states relied on juries to sentence ordinary criminals.24 Today, jury sentencing is 
reserved almost exclusively for death penalty hearings.25 
Courts and parole boards, by contrast, have played a central role in 
sentencing during much of the last century. Those two institutions formed the core 
elements of the “indeterminate sentencing system.”26 By the 1960s, this was the 
                                                                                                            
 23. A number of other institutions may also have a significant effect on 
punishment. Perhaps the most notable is the prosecution, which can influence sentences 
through charging and related decisions. Nonetheless, the prosecutor’s office is not typically 
viewed as being a neutral sentencing institution, and consideration of its role adds significant 
complexities to the analysis. Thus, for this preliminary effort, the role of prosecutors is set 
aside. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORT OF APRIL 11, 2003, MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING 9–10 (2003) [hereinafter ALI 2003] (describing reasons for deferring 
consideration of prosecutorial discretion in the ALI’s recent sentencing proposals). 
 24. See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 
311, 319 (2003). 
 25. According to one estimate, only six states—Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia—rely on jury sentencing in noncapital cases to any degree. 
Id. at 314 n.16. Even among this group, the jury’s role varies. For example, in Virginia, jury 
sentencing is only advisory; the judge makes the final decision on sentencing matters. Id. at 
355. In Arkansas, the jury sets the maximum sentence, but the judge can impose a more 
lenient sentence in the interests of justice. Id. In Kentucky, a defendant can waive jury 
sentencing, but only with the consent of the prosecutor. Id. at 376–77. In Oklahoma, the judge 
must consent to such a waiver. Id. at 377. Finally,  
[i]n all states, jury sentencing occurs in only a small percent of the 
docketed cases, because over ninety percent of cases are plea bargained; 
and even where the defendant has the option of being sentenced by a jury 
after a guilty plea, this choice is, rationally, almost never exercised in 
practice.  
Id. at 355. 
 26. Although the term has been used in varied ways, “indeterminate sentencing” 
commonly “include[s] very broad legislative ranges of permissible punishments for most 
offenses, unguided and unreviewable trial-court discretion to pronounce sentences within 
permitted statutory ranges, and appreciable powers (also unguided and unreviewable) vested 
in parole and corrections officials to determine prison-release dates.” ALI 2003, supra note 
23, at 19 n.23; see also DAN STEMEN & ANDRE RENGIFO, OF FRAGMENTATION AND FERMENT: 
THE IMPACT OF STATE SENTENCING POLICIES ON INCARCERATION RATES, 1975-2002, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 9 (2016) (similar). 
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near-universal approach to punishment in the United States, and it remains the 
system employed in many jurisdictions today.27 
Starting in the late 1970s, two other institutions—legislatures and 
sentencing commissions—emerged as increasingly dominant players. Legislatures 
have always played some role at sentencing, but they began to intervene more 
forcefully in the last decades of the 20th century. Among other things, legislatures 
enacted a slew of mandatory-minimum laws, which significantly circumscribed 
judicial and parole-board discretion at sentencing.28 In some jurisdictions, 
legislatures abolished discretionary parole, ensuring that offenders could not be 
released before their full terms were completed.29 Legislatures also established 
sentencing commissions, which enacted rules to further constrain judicial discretion 
at sentencing.30 The result has been a more “determinate” system of punishment, in 
which penalties are set out in rules and laws enacted by legislatures and 
commissions. 
The modern movement toward determinate sentencing has hardly settled 
the debate over the institutional structure of sentencing. All five of the sentencing 
candidates have their vocal supporters. Sentencing commissions continue to receive 
strong praise from a wide range of individuals and groups, with some urging the 
further expansion of this method of sentencing.31 Legislative sentencing has its 
                                                                                                            
 27. See ALISON LAWRENCE, MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING: STATE SYSTEMS AND 
POLICIES 4–5 (2015) (eighteen states have indeterminate sentencing schemes lacking any kind 
of structured sentencing component). 
 28. For a historical view of federal mandatory minimums, see U.S. SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, Ch. 2. In a few states, legislatures went further, creating detailed 
sentencing rules. In California, for example, the legislature enacted basic sentencing rules for 
run-of-the-mill crimes. See Sheldon L. Messinger & Philip E. Johnson, California’s 
Determinate Sentencing Statute: History and Issues, 1 DETERMINATE SENT’G: REFORM OR 
REGRESSION 13, 29 (1978). 
 29. This is true of the federal system, for example, which abolished parole by 
enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 30. ALI 2003, supra note 23, at 50–51 (“Guideline systems vary widely from one 
another, but nearly all accept the starting premise that there should be a permanent 
policymaking body at the jurisdiction-wide level, usually called a sentencing commission, 
with dual responsibilities of research and prescription.”). Roughly two dozen states and the 
federal government have adopted this method of sentencing. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6A.01 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft #1 2007) [hereinafter ALI 2007]. 
 31. In recent decades, the ABA and the ALI have both concluded that sentencing 
commissions deserve broader application. See ALI 2003, supra note 23, at 47 (“After five 
years of study, the commission-guidelines model became the centerpiece of the American Bar 
Association’s recommendations in its revised Criminal Justice Standards for Sentencing, 
published in 1994.”); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING § 18-6.1 (AM. BAR 
ASS'N 1975); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING 
(3d ed. 1994); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED 
SENTENCING 127 (1996) (concluding “the most promising structured sentencing model” to 
address problems of disparity, incarceration rates, and prison crowding, was “sentencing 
guidelines developed by sentencing commissions”). 
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defenders too, particularly among law-and-order supporters of mandatory 
minimums.32 Meanwhile, a growing number of commentators have urged the 
adoption of the elements of indeterminate sentencing, arguing for an expansion of 
court and parole-board power.33 Even jury sentencing has its fans, though admittedly 
these remain in the distinct minority.34 The question thus remains: which 
institution—or group of institutions—is best able to advance utilitarian goals? 
C. Three Complexities 
Even limiting the focus to these five institutions, the analysis can quickly 
become unwieldy. The principal reason is that these institutions can be structured 
and combined in various ways, creating numerous complexities in the analysis. 
                                                                                                            
  Sentencing commissions have their detractors, as well, and criticism has been 
heaped, in particular, on the federal sentencing commission, which is widely seen as an 
excessively rigid and inflexible system that diverts far too much power from judges. See, e.g., 
Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, ATLANTIC (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-for-
judgment/463380/ (discussing view that judges, not sentencing commissions, should exercise 
sentencing discretion); Dan Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: 
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1684–85 (1992) 
(offering wide-ranging critique of federal guideline system). 
 32. See, e.g., Maura Ewing, The Federal Prosecutors Backing Jeff Sessions on 
Mandatory Minimums, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/mandatory-minimums-sessions-
naausa-sentencing/527619/; Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory 
Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 69 (2009) (“No one 
who has lived in the United States, however, can be unaware that conservative politicians for 
3 decades consistently promoted passage of more and harsher mandatory sentence laws.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Noah Atchison, Bipartisan Efforts on Criminal Justice Reform 
Continue, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 27, 2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/bipartisan-efforts-criminal-justice-reform-continue  
(discussing legislative efforts to expand judicial discretion); SAMANTHA HARVELL ET AL., 
REFORMING SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY (2016) (urging reforms to expand judicial 
discretion at sentencing and increase opportunities for parole); cf. Inimai Chettiar & Udi Ofer, 
The ‘Tough on Crime’ Wave is Finally Cresting, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 13, 2018), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-tough-on-crime-wave-is-finally-cresting. These efforts 
have already led to significant reforms, including changes to mandatory-sentencing statutes 
in many states. See, e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE ADVANCES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REFORM, 2016, at 1–4 (2017) (summarizing changes); FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY 
MINIMUMS, RECENT STATE-LEVEL REFORMS TO MANDATORY MINIMUMS LAWS (2017) (same).    
 34. Advocates have argued that jury sentencing has been unfairly neglected. See 
Iontcheva, supra note 24, at 35; Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea 
Whose Time has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1776 (1999). The central argument for 
an expanded jury role relies heavily on claims about the importance of promoting democratic 
participation in the criminal justice field. See Nancy J. King & Roosevelt L. Noble, Felony 
Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 888 (2004) (noting 
that, for its academic supporters, “jury sentencing could perform a very special function—the 
jury’s sentence could reflect the community’s view of punishment, a view that may be 
different from that of a professional judge”). 
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Three complexities are particularly notable, and each requires a strategy to keep the 
analysis focused. 
The first complexity arises because individual institutions can be combined 
in various ways within a single sentencing system. Sentencing, in other words, 
almost always involves a system of shared powers.35 The possible permutations are 
endless and far beyond the scope of a single paper to investigate. To address this 
complexity, this analysis starts by evaluating each sentencing institution 
independently, adopting the assumption that the institution is the sole or dominant 
sentencing power in a jurisdiction. This means, for example, that when analyzing 
judicial sentencing, we will assume that judges have the sole and unfettered 
discretion to determine the appropriate sentence, without any control by the 
legislature or any other institution. This is plainly counterfactual, but the simplifying 
assumption allows us to carefully examine the specific biases and competences of 
the individual institution. In a later Section, this assumption is suspended, and we 
briefly consider whether a shared system of powers would be more just and 
effective. 
A second complexity arises because sentencing institutions themselves can 
be structured in a range of ways, each with distinct properties and biases. Again, 
surveying the range of options is not feasible. Instead, this analysis focuses on a 
single exemplar of the institution. In specifying the relevant features of that model, 
we will follow a principle of charitable interpretation. That is to say, we will assume 
that an institution is designed not only in a plausible way, but also in a way that 
gives it the best chance of promoting utilitarian goals. Thus, for example, in 
discussing the federal judiciary, our attention will be focused on life-tenured judges, 
rather than elected ones, because (as we shall discuss) the former has a far better 
chance of promoting utilitarian goals. 
A third and final complexity concerns the sentencing decision itself. 
Roughly speaking, one can think of the sentencing decision as encompassing two 
key parts: the first is the fact-finding phase, which involves identifying the specific 
details of the offense and offender; the second is the valuation phase, which focuses 
on identifying the appropriate sentence in light of the specific facts of the case. 
Different skills may be relevant for each operation, which at least suggests the 
possibility that different institutions might be appropriate for each. For purposes of 
this Paper, however, we will focus solely on the “valuation” part of the decision. We 
will assume, in other words, that the facts are given, and what remains is for the 
sentencing institution to determine what sentence is justified.36 No recommendation 
is offered in this Paper about the institution best able to find the relevant facts of the 
case. 
                                                                                                            
 35. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PENN. L. REV. 733, 
735 (1980) (“Typically, sentencing power is shared by prosecutors, judges, and a parole board 
or similar administrative agency.”). See generally Kevin Reitz, Modeling Discretion in 
American Sentencing Systems, 20 LAW & POL. 389 (1998) (discussing how different 
sentencing systems allocate discretion). 
 36. Of course, a fact-finder can influence the ultimate sentence by highlighting or 
suppressing certain facts (as can a prosecutor). For purposes of this Paper, this complication 
is ignored. 
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II. THE MORAL ORIENTATION OF INSTITUTIONS 
In assessing the merits of the five traditional sentencing institutions, the 
first question is perhaps the least obvious. The institutional designer must ask: what 
kind of institution is most likely to be committed to promoting utilitarian goals? This 
might seem like an odd question to ask because it is not immediately clear how 
institutional structure is relevant to an entity’s objectives. One might think, for 
example, that the goals of an institution simply depend on the objectives of the 
individuals elected or appointed to run the organization. If those individuals are 
utilitarians, the institution will pursue utilitarian goals; if the individuals have other 
goals (say, retribution), those other goals will be pursued.37 
The reality, however, is more complex. Most individuals do not come to 
their institutional roles embracing moral theories that they apply consistently and 
rigorously in their decision-making. They do not, in other words, think like 
philosophers. Instead, individual actors are capable of adopting various moral 
positions: they might focus on an offender’s blameworthiness at one moment (a 
retributive consideration) and then emphasize public-safety concerns at another 
(usually a utilitarian factor). Part of what affects individuals’ moral orientations is 
the structure of their institutional environments. The challenge for the organizational 
designer, then, is to identify an institutional structure that will increase the likelihood 
that consequentialist factors will predominate and decrease the likelihood that 
nonconsequentialist considerations will come to the fore.38 
A. Utilitarianism & Moral Psychology 
To identify the factors that encourage a utilitarian orientation, the 
institutional designer can find some guidance in recent research in moral 
psychology. Indeed, the past decade has seen an enormous surge in empirical work 
examining how individuals make moral decisions.39 Although the field is still new 
and the findings tentative, the research has direct relevance to the field of 
institutional analysis. 
1. Moral Dilemmas 
Much of the new research has focused on how human beings make moral 
judgments—specifically why the very same individuals sometimes make judgments 
aligned with consequentialist theories (like utilitarianism) and at other times reach 
                                                                                                            
 37. See WALDRON, supra note 7, at 10. 
 38. To avoid misunderstanding, the claim is not that institutional design alone 
determines how moral goals are chosen. Other factors might be relevant, including the 
background and beliefs of the individual decision-makers. But institutional design is a notable 
factor nonetheless. As Jeremy Waldron has written, “institutional forms can be designed so 
as to outwit and outflank what Hume called ‘the casual humors and characters of particular 
men.’” Id. at 1. Moreover, it is a factor that can be shaped by policymakers when the 
sentencing system is established. 
 39. Janice Nadler & Pam Mueller, Social Psychology and the Law, in 1 THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 124, 138 (2017) (“Moral psychology is a 
burgeoning subfield within social psychology, and recent findings inform a wide range of 
legal processes.”). 
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decisions more consistent with nonconsequentialist (or “deontological”) theories.40 
A common research strategy has been to pose moral dilemmas to individuals and 
study how the participants react.41 
One of the most famous moral dilemmas is the well-known “trolley 
dilemma.” As Joshua Greene describes it: 
A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it 
proceeds on its present course. The only way to save these people is 
to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto a side track, where it will 
run over and kill one person instead of five. Is it okay to turn the 
trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one?42 
The consequentialist’s approach is straightforward: pull the switch, 
because it is better to save five lives than only one. In contrast, the deontologist 
might reach a different result: rather than focusing on the consequences of an act, 
the deontologist looks at the inherent goodness or badness of the act itself. That 
might lead the deontologist to refuse to pull the switch, because turning the trolley 
would lead to the killing of an innocent person. The moral principle—don’t kill the 
innocent—might trump any consequentialist analysis. 
In empirical testing, most people vote to pull the switch in this scenario, 
suggesting a characteristically utilitarian approach to the trolley problem.43 
However, by modifying the facts slightly, researchers can elicit a more deontological 
approach. A common counter-example is the “footbridge dilemma.” Here is Joshua 
Greene’s description again: 
As before, a runaway trolley threatens to kill five people, but this time 
you are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge spanning the 
tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. The only 
way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge and 
onto the tracks below. He will die as a result, but his body will stop the 
trolley from reaching the others. Is it okay to save the five people by 
pushing this stranger to his death?44 
This time most people refuse to say that they would push the man onto the tracks; 
they will not sacrifice one man to save five. In other words, Greene concludes, 
“people exhibit a characteristically consequentialist response to the trolley case and 
                                                                                                            
 40. Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Souls, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 35, 
37 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008) (“Deontology is defined by its emphasis on moral rules, 
most often articulated in terms of rights and duties. Consequentialism, in contrast, is the view 
that the moral value of an action is in one way or another a function of its consequences alone. 
Consequentialists maintain that moral decision-makers should always aim to produce the best 
overall consequences for all concerned, if not directly then indirectly.”). 
 41. See Michael Laakasuo & Jukka Sundvall, Are Utilitarian/Deontological 
Preferences Unidimensional?, 7 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1228, 1229 (2016) (“In recent years, 
these two moral preferences have been studied in the field of moral psychology by using 
vignettes, stories, and dilemmas.”). 
 42. Greene, supra note 40, at 41–42. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
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a characteristically deontological response to the footbridge case.”45 These results 
point to a puzzle: why, as a psychological matter, do individuals adopt different 
moral goals in these similar scenarios?46 
2. The Dual-Process Theory 
Joshua Greene proposes an explanation. He argues that human beings have 
two different mental processes for reasoning about moral matters—one more closely 
associated with consequentialist thinking; the other aligned with 
nonconsequentialist approaches.47 
These processes take place in different parts of the brain, suggesting 
different biological mechanisms for each.48 They also operate in very different ways. 
For example, the nonconsequentialist process appears to require a smaller degree of 
effort and, perhaps as a result, operates at a faster speed.49 That helps explain why 
individuals, when given moral dilemmas under stress or time constraints, tend to 
favor deontological decisions. By contrast, utilitarian considerations become more 
                                                                                                            
 45. Id. This is not to say that individuals who choose the “characteristically” 
utilitarian approach fully embrace the doctrine of utilitarianism favored by Mill and Bentham 
or any other philosophical doctrine associated with consequentialism. Nor is it to say that 
individuals who adopt the deontological position adopt Kant’s philosophy or the philosophy 
of any other deontological thinker. Researchers are not talking about a conflict between fully-
thought-out philosophical positions; they are talking about orientations that are loosely 
consistent with one moral theory rather than another. Psychological orientations should not 
be confused with deeply considered philosophical theories. See generally id. at 37–39. 
 46. This is a descriptive question, which should not be confused with the 
normative (and philosophical) question concerning whether the answers to the trolley and 
footbridge scenarios are justified. See id. at 42 (“Philosophers have generally offered a variety 
of normative explanations. That is, they have assumed that our responses to these cases are 
correct, or at least reasonable, and have sought principles that justify treating these two cases 
differently . . . . [In contrast, my] collaborators and I have proposed a partial and purely 
descriptive solution to this problem and have collected some scientific evidence in favor of 
it.”). 
 47. Joshua Greene, Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive 
(Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics, 124 ETHICS 695, 700 (2014). 
 48. Joshua Greene et al., Embedding Ethical Principles in Collective Decision 
Support Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE (AAAI-16) 4147, 4248 (2016) (noting that MRI scans indicate that different 
brain regions are triggered when individuals make deontological and consequentialist 
decisions); see also Cendri Hutcherson et al., Emotional and Utilitarian Appraisals of Moral 
Dilemmas Are Encoded in Separate Areas and Integrated in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 
35 J. NEUROSCI. 12593, 12604 (2015) (“Our results support a nuanced version of the 
dual-systems view of moral choice.”); Paul Robinson, Robert Kurzba & Owen Jones, The 
Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1661 (2007) (“[S]tudies have 
shown that specific regions of the brain are used for specific functions, including moral 
reasoning.”). 
 49. See Greene, supra note 40, at 60 (The “emotions [that underlie non-
consequentialist thought] are very reliable, quick, and efficient responses to recurring 
situations, whereas reasoning is unreliable, slow, and inefficient in such contexts.”). 
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prevalent when participants are given greater opportunities for reflection and 
deliberation.50 
From these and related studies, Greene concludes that the deontological 
mechanism operates as an intuitive, fast-operating process, one that occurs 
automatically without any conscious thinking. By contrast, the consequentialist 
process is a slower, more methodological process requiring more effort.51 This 
“dual-process theory,” as Greene calls it, rests on a wealth of supporting data;52 it 
                                                                                                            
 50. Michael Bialek & Sylvia Terbeck, Can Cognitive Psychological Research On 
Reasoning Enhance The Discussion Around Moral Judgments?, 17 COGNITION PROCESS 329, 
330 (2016) (“[T]he tendency to engage in reflection increases the likelihood of utilitarian 
decisions.”); Zachary Horne & Derek Powell, How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments 
of Moral Dilemmas?, PLOS ONE, July 6, 2016, at 3 (“[R]eaction time data and experiments 
examining speed-pressure and cognitive load manipulations suggest that deliberative 
reasoning is crucial for utilitarian judgments—utilitarian judgments are sometimes slower, 
and seem to be impaired by speed-pressure and increased cognitive load. . . .” (citations 
omitted)). But see Gustav Tinghog et al., Intuition and Moral Decision-Making: The Effect of 
Time Pressure and Cognitive Load on Moral Judgment and Altruistic Behavior, PLOS ONE, 
Oct. 26, 2016, at 15 (“In two studies, we applied time pressure and cognitive load to 
investigate the effect of intuition on moral decision-making . . . . [W]e find no supporting 
evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and intuitive decisions in the dictator 
game differ from more reflectively taken decisions.”). 
 51. Greene compares the two-tiered system to a camera with two settings. The 
camera’s automatic setting responds instantaneously using preset procedures. Its manual 
mode requires more effort and thought to use, but it can operate in a more nuanced manner to 
account for special circumstances. See Greene, supra note 47, at 696 (2014); see also Bialek 
& Terbeck, supra note 50, at 330 (“Researchers have proposed the theory that the two 
components on which decisions are based are intuition (Type 1 processing) and reflection 
(Type 2 processing). Type 1 processing is fast, automatic, and heuristic, while Type 2 
processing is slow, rule-based, and typically requires cognitive resources . . . .”). 
 52. See JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES 199 (2013) (discussing “dual-process 
theory”). Much of the research supporting this theory originally utilized moral dilemmas, like 
the trolley problem, that took place outside the punishment field. Tehila Kogut, The Role of 
Perspective Taking and Emotions In Punishing Identified And Unidentified Wrongdoers, 25 
COGNITION & EMOTION 1491, 1492 (2011) (noting that past research focuses mostly on 
“willingness to help,” rather than on punishment decisions). More recent research has begun 
to explore how moral reasoning applies in the punishment field as well. That work appears to 
confirm that the same dual-process approach applies in this context. See, e.g., Bunmi Olatunji 
& Bieke Puncochar, Delineating the Influence of Emotion and Reason on Morality and 
Punishment, REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 201 (2014) (“Although punishment decisions, more so than 
moral judgment, seem to rely on conscious reasoning and consideration of violation 
outcomes, automatic, emotion-driven processes nevertheless influence punishment decisions, 
and may at times dominate them.”) (citation omitted). 
  It is fair to say the dual-process model represents the leading theory of moral 
psychology today. Cf. Hutcherson et al., supra note 48, 12593–94 (“Most approaches to these 
questions” rely on a dual-process theory). At the same time, Greene’s theory is not without 
critics, and a number of rival accounts have been advanced. See, e.g., Bialek & Terbeck, supra 
note 50 (discussing the rival approach of Jonathan Haidt); Gustav Tinghog et al., supra note 
50 (noting alternative theory proposed by Gürçay and Baron). 
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will serve as our working hypothesis going forward concerning how individuals 
make moral decisions. 
B. Relevance of the Decision-Making Environment 
A particularly interesting feature of the empirical research is the suggestion 
that various aspects of the decision-maker’s environment might influence which of 
the two cognitive processes is favored. Three factors in particular appear to be 
significant: first, the emotional vibrancy of the decision; second, the individual’s 
scope of responsibility; and third, the decision-maker’s opportunities for 
deliberation and reflection. These factors provide a set of criteria for assessing which 
institution is most likely to adopt a utilitarian goal. 
1. Emotional Vibrancy of Decision 
The emotional vibrancy of a decision is probably the central factor 
influencing moral deliberation. Indeed, it has long been recognized that emotions 
play a major role in deontological thinking.53 Strongly held emotions of anger and 
disgust, among others, are associated with intuitive desires to punish violators or 
help victims, and thus they increase the likelihood that an individual will adopt 
nonconsequentialist ways of thinking.54 By contrast, consequentialist thinking tends 
to be more deliberative, abstract, and “cognitive.”55 Thus, where individuals are able 
to moderate their emotional responses and consider decisions more abstractly, 
utilitarian considerations are favored.56 
In the punishment realm, several factors increase the emotional potency of 
a sentencing decision. Perhaps most obviously, the more violent and severe the 
                                                                                                            
  One further appeal of the dual-process theory is that it is consistent with the 
work of Daniel Kahneman and others, who contend that human decision-making in general 
involves two different processes—fast and slow thinking. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING 
FAST AND SLOW (2013); see also Denise Dellarosa Cummins & Robert C. Cummins, Emotion 
and Deliberative Reasoning in Moral Judgment, 3 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 328, 328 (2012) 
(“This dual-process explanation of moral judgment is consistent with several decades of 
cognitive science research on decision-making in other domains.”). 
 53. Greene, supra note 40, at 110 (“For a representation to be ‘emotional’, it must 
be quick, automatic, etc., and also valenced. It must ‘say’ that something is good or bad . . . , 
a little voice that pops out of nowhere and says ‘No! That would be wrong!’”). 
 54. This view is supported by a wide array of scientific evidence. For example, 
MRI studies indicate that the brain areas used when individuals make nonconsequential 
(system 1) decisions are those associated with emotions. See id. at 40–41. Similarly, 
individuals who suffer disabilities that damage emotional responsiveness have a much-
diminished tendency to adopt the nonutilitarian orientation. Id. at 59 & 110–12. 
 55. See id. at 44–46 (noting that “people exhibit more ‘cognitive’ activity when 
they give the consequentialist answer”). To be sure, as Greene notes, consequentialist 
thinking is not devoid of all emotional content. Rather, the difference between the emotional 
content of consequentialist and deontological thinking is a matter of degree. See id. at 41 
(“[A]ll moral judgment (including consequentialist judgment) must have some emotional 
component . . . but I suspect that the kind of emotion that is essential to consequentialism is 
fundamentally different from the kind that is essential to deontology, the former functioning 
more like a currency and the latter functioning more like an alarm.”). 
 56. See, e.g., GREENE supra note 52, at 127. 
 
2018] DESIGN OF PUNISHMENT 929 
criminal violation, the more likely that deontological mechanisms will 
predominate.57 Thus, physically aggressive crimes increase the chances that 
decision-makers will adopt nonconsequentialist ways of reasoning. In addition, 
situations involving specific, concrete victims tend to have more salience than cases 
involving individuals considered in the abstract. The “identifiable victim effect,” as 
it is called, generates a strong retributive response.58 
Greene refers to violations that involve both factors—direct aggressive 
action against concrete individuals—as “personal harms.”59 These violations are 
most likely to trigger nonconsequentialist thinking.60 This feature helps explain why 
pushing an individual off a footbridge invokes the retributive principle “do not kill 
the innocent,” while pulling a switch does not, at least to the same extent. 
These observations have implications for institutional design. Perhaps most 
notably, they suggest that, to promote utilitarian thinking, an institution should be 
designed in a way that creates some emotional distance from specific offenders and 
their concrete crimes. The most feasible way to achieve that result is to ensure that 
an institution addresses a sentencing question in the abstract rather than in the 
context of a specific individual’s case.61 All else being equal, entities that confront 
defendants more directly, such as juries, are more likely to react in an intuitive, 
retributive manner. Conversely, institutions that have some distance from the 
                                                                                                            
 57. M. Treadway et al., Corticolimbic Gating of Emotion-Driven Punishment, 17 
NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1270, 1270 (2014) (“Using fMRI, we found that emotionally graphic 
descriptions of harmful acts amplify punishment severity, boost amygdala activity and 
strengthen amygdala connectivity with lateral prefrontal regions involved in punishment 
decision-making.”); Bialek & Terbeck, supra note 50, at 332 (“[I]t has been shown that 
increased severity of harm decreased the likelihood of making a utilitarian decision.”). 
 58. The identifiable victim effect has been repeatedly confirmed. See Greene, 
supra note 40, at 48–49. The effect has been validated in the punishment context, as well. See 
id. at 53 (noting the “parallel effect in the domain of punishment”); Kogut, supra note 52, at 
1497 (“[T]he availability of a concrete identifiable target increases the role of emotions in the 
decision regarding the severity of the punishment.”). 
 59. Joshua D. Greene, The Cognitive NeuroScience of Moral Judgment and 
Decision Making, in THE MORAL BRAIN: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 1013, 1016 n.1 
(Jean Decety & Thalia Wheatley eds., 2015). 
 60. As Greene notes, “[w]hen a moral violation is ‘personal’ (as in the footbridge 
case), it triggers a strong, negative emotional response that inclines people to judge against it. 
When a moral violation is ‘impersonal’ (as in the trolley case), there is no comparable 
emotional response, and the judgment is made in a ‘cooler,’ more ‘cognitive’ way.” Greene, 
supra note 40, at 106; see also Horne & Powell, supra note 50. 
 61. Nadler & Mueller, supra note 39, at 141 (“[O]nly recently have researchers 
systematically investigated the psychological influence of deterrence and retribution motives 
on people’s punishment judgments. The results indicate an interesting division: in the 
abstract, people explicitly endorse utilitarian goals . . . but when presented with a specific 
scenario, they consistently choose to impose retributive punishments . . . .”).  
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sentencing decision, such as sentencing commissions, are more likely to adopt a 
utilitarian framework.62 
2. Scope of Responsibility 
A second relevant factor concerns the scope of the decision-maker’s 
responsibilities. According to preliminary research, individuals who have a society-
wide perspective may be more likely to take into account the broader costs and 
benefits of a decision, while individuals who are narrowly focused on one individual 
tend to react in a more intuitive, moralizing way.63 That effect is suggested by a 
study carried out by Joshua Greene comparing two kinds of health-care 
professionals—doctors and public-health scientists. Greene writes: 
Doctors aim to promote the health of specific individuals and are 
duty-bound to minimize the risk of actively harming their patients. 
Thus, one might expect doctors to be especially concerned with the 
rights of the individual. For public health professionals, by contrast, 
the patient is the society as a whole, and the primary mission is to 
promote the greater good . . . . Thus, one might expect public health 
professionals to be especially concerned with the greater good.64 
Greene confirms that this is exactly what his research found: 
Public health professionals, as compared with doctors, gave more 
utilitarian responses to both the trolley-type dilemmas and to our 
more realistic healthcare dilemmas. The public health professionals 
were also more utilitarian than ordinary people, whose judgments 
resembled those of the medical doctors. In other words, most people, 
like doctors, are automatically tuned in to the rights of the individual. 
Giving priority to the greater good seems to require something more 
unusual.65 
                                                                                                            
 62. The idea that individuals react differently when crafting general, future-
oriented rules, rather than punishing an identifiable wrongdoer, seems quite plausible. Tehila 
Kogut writes: 
Imagine a school student behaving in an inappropriate way, violating the 
school’s rules or even hurting another student. Given that the teacher 
decides to punish the student, to what extent will his/her decision be 
guided by emotions towards the student? Now think about the same 
teacher trying to set rules for the school code, including the expected 
punishment for the violation of each rule. Will decisions about the 
appropriate punishment, following the same behaviour, be different than 
the one chosen in the specific case? Will the punishment meted out to a 
specific identified student be more or less severe than the punishment 
determined in a general perspective (without reference to a specific case)? 
To what extent will the decision be guided by the decision maker’s 
emotions in each of the two cases?) 
Kogut, supra note 52, at 1491. 
 63. GREENE, supra note 52, at 129–30. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 130. 
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In short, public-health officials, who have a broad view of health effects on 
society, tend to adopt a consequentialist way of thinking; doctors, who are 
responsible for a single individual, tend to possess a more deontological 
framework.66 The results may be due, in part, to the identifiable victim effect 
mentioned above, but they may also be due to the way that decision-makers’ 
responsibilities alter their perspectives on moral questions. 
These results have implications for the punishment field. Certain 
sentencing institutions, such as the legislature, possess a system-wide perspective; 
their responsibility, in a sense, is for society at large. Others, like judges, are 
principally focused on an individual criminal case. The implication is that, for a 
utilitarian, sentencing authority should be given to institutional actors with the 
broader, system-wide perspective, because they are more likely to adopt a 
consequentialist approach to punishment decisions. 
3. Opportunities for Reflection 
Finally, cognitive research suggests that the decision-maker’s opportunities 
for reflection can affect his or her moral orientation. When required to make 
decisions under time constraints or with other stressors, individuals default to the 
automatic and intuitive nonconsequentialist thinking.67 Conversely, some evidence 
indicates that efforts to promote deliberation and increase accountability may 
encourage a more reasoned approach that is conducive to utilitarian thinking.68 
Institutions can be structured to promote a more reflective decision-making 
environment. For example, establishing a multi-member decision-making panel or 
commission can increase the likelihood that the members deliberate over various 
policy options. Mandating a period of time for input from affected individuals, 
requiring actors to consider those comments, and demanding that the officials issue 
a statement of reasons for their decisions would help, as well. All of these features 
should be considered, because all can be helpful in calming the emotions of the 
punishment decision, thus promoting consequentialist thinking. 
                                                                                                            
 66. This evidence is only suggestive. It is possible, for example, that individuals 
with consequentialist tendencies are drawn to public-health careers, and those with 
nonconsequentialist tendencies are drawn more to direct-service professions. In that case, 
institutional roles do not drive moral perspectives; rather, moral orientation drives 
institutional-role selection. 
 67. Cummins & Cummins, supra note 52, at 340 (noting that researchers “found 
that activation of the stress response yielded a reduction in utilitarian responses that was 
specific to personal moral dilemmas that described deontological violations”). 
 68. Bialek & Turbek, supra note 50, at 330 (noting that with controlled 
deliberation, individuals “usually decide counter to their immediate intuitions and might 
therefore reach a utilitarian decision”); Joseph Paxton, Leo Unger & Joshua Greene, 
Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment, 36 COGNITION SCI. 163, 163 (2011) (more time 
for deliberation increases utilitarian response); Olatunji & Puncochar, supra note 52, at 199 
(when anger is checked by an accountability mechanism, priming effect is reduced). 
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C. Moral Goals and the Traditional Punishment Institutions 
The research into moral psychology provides a general blueprint for 
creating an institution relatively well-oriented to promoting utilitarian goals. That 
institution should possess all three structural features mentioned above.69 First, it 
should be charged with promulgating general sentencing rules rather than imposing 
punishment on specific individuals. Second, it should have a system-wide 
perspective on punishment decisions, including a responsibility to consider the 
interests of the community at large. Third, it should be subject to procedures that 
encourage reflection and deliberation. With these criteria in mind, we can evaluate 
the likelihood that the five traditional sentencing institutions will be oriented toward 
utilitarian goals. 
1. Jury 
To start with a relatively straightforward case, the jury’s structure is poorly 
designed to encourage the adoption of utilitarian goals. Jurors impose sentences in 
specific, concrete cases. Their direct exposure to the defendant and to the details of 
the crime make it likely that jurors will have an emotional involvement in the 
sentencing decision.70 Further, because a jury sits in judgment over a specific 
offender, the jury’s responsibility is often viewed as doing justice in the individual 
case, rather than considering the broader social costs or benefits of its punishment 
decisions. The emotional intensity of its decision-making environment and its lack 
of a system-wide perspective makes the jury particularly susceptible to retributive 
thinking.71 
2. Judiciary 
The judiciary hardly seems more promising. Like jurors, judges tend to 
focus on the offender before the court, and they typically lack a system-wide 
perspective on punishment. One might expect, then, that judges are no more likely 
to adopt consequentialist goals than jurors. This conclusion, though, may be too 
quick. At least two institutional factors make the judiciary somewhat more amenable 
to consequentialism. 
                                                                                                            
 69. See supra Section II.B. 
 70. Such a reaction seems particularly likely when victims or others affected by 
the crime are permitted to make pleas for retribution, or when the jury is confronted with 
graphic descriptions of harm. In these cases, one might expect the jury to react with an 
emotional, moralizing response, rather than a utilitarian one. 
 71. Perhaps the only factor that tempers this retributive orientation is that jurors 
must deliberate before reaching a decision. Ideally, that deliberation would allow emotions to 
cool off and future consequences to be considered. Susan Bandes & Jessica Salerno, Emotion, 
Proof and Prejudice: The Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact 
Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1051 (2014) (“Deliberation can force jurors to be 
accountable to other people, not only for their decision, but also for the reasons behind their 
decision.”). In some situations, however, cool heads do not prevail, and group dynamics 
intensify the emotional reaction or biases among jurors. Id. (“Alternatively, deliberation 
might also maximize initial biases, or do little more than develop the picture that was formed 
before deliberation among the majority of jurors.”). 
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First, judges likely have a greater ability than jurors to withstand the 
emotions wrought by the punishment decision. Unlike jurors, judges sit on 
numerous cases and, at least at the federal level, possess a strong tradition of 
professionalism.72 These factors should encourage judges to act more 
dispassionately and resist the pull of the more automatic retributive impulse. 
Second, given their repeated involvement in sentencing cases, judges are 
likely more inclined to deliberate abstractly about the purposes of punishment. That 
kind of exercise may help promote a more reflective approach too, which could 
increase the likelihood that judges favor a more utilitarian approach.73 
The judiciary, in short, shares certain institutional features with the jury, 
including a narrow focus on the individual offender, that orient it toward retributive 
goals. But it also possesses several countervailing factors that encourage a more 
reflective—and hence consequentialist—approach.74 The result is an institution that 
may not embrace utilitarian thinking in all cases but that is at least marginally more 
likely to do so than the jury.75 
                                                                                                            
 72. Gill Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the 
Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 100 (2009) (the federal 
court system “is characterized by a high measure of procedural homogeneity, a standardized 
culture marked by a strong ethic of professionalism, and a bench that exhibits generally high 
levels of competence in the stuff of judge-craft”). 
 73. See supra note 61. Besides the factors mentioned in the text, judges also 
engage in a deliberative process when imposing punishment. Sentencing typically involves a 
hearing, with the opportunity for both sides to introduce evidence in their favor. One might 
hope that the process allows judges to engage the more analytical, reflective parts of their 
personalities, allowing them to withstand the emotional pull of retribution. 
 74. In fact, there is some preliminary evidence that this is the case. See John M. 
Darley, Citizens’ Assignments of Punishments for Moral Transgressions: A Case Study in the 
Psychology of Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 101, 113 (2010) (“John Hogarth’s 
monumental study, begun in 1965 and published in 1971, examined different influences on 
the sentencing practices of seventy-one full time magistrates in the province of Ontario . . . . 
Interestingly, in this particular study, not many judges regarded the retributive goal that we 
have argued is the primary driver of the sentencing judgments made by people reacting in the 
intuitive mode as an important purpose of sentencing.”). 
 75. The analysis also suggests that structural changes in the judiciary might 
encourage a more consequentialist approach. One proposal might be to authorize appellate 
courts to develop a set of sentencing rules that would guide sentencing decisions in typical 
cases. In essence, appellate courts over time would announce standard sentences that trial 
courts should adopt in cases that had the specified features. If a trial court wished to depart 
from the standard sentence, it would be required to explain its justification. Appellate courts 
would review sentencing decisions to ensure rough conformity with their rules. In theory, this 
would at least create general guideposts for sentencing decisions by trial courts. 
  In effect, appellate courts would create a common law of sentencing. By 
locating sentencing power in the appellate courts, this approach might reduce the emotional 
involvement and immediacy of the sentencing judgment and allow the sentencing decision to 
be made dispassionately and from a system-wide perspective. 
  The solution has some appeal, though it is not without shortcomings. Among 
other things, a common-law approach is a very slow method for developing rules, as it must 
proceed methodologically in a case-by-case manner. Further, the approach will yield 
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3. Legislature 
In contrast to the previous two institutions, the legislature is structured in a 
manner that seems well-suited for promoting consequentialist goals. The legislature, 
for one, is charged with crafting general, forward-looking rules, rather than 
imposing sentences on individual offenders. Moreover, its scope of responsibility is 
exceptionally broad. The legislature’s system-wide perspective requires its 
members, at least in theory, to consider the costs and benefits of its policies for 
society at large. Indeed, the tradeoffs required by the utilitarian calculus are the 
natural stuff of legislative policymaking. 
Despite these initial impressions, real questions exist about the legislature’s 
commitment to utilitarian principles. A central issue concerns its political 
sensitivity. Legislators do not consider the sentencing decision in a vacuum but are 
inevitably influenced at some level by the punishment views of their constituents. 
The legislature’s moral goals, as a result, depend in part on their constituents’ likely 
moral orientations. 
The institution’s appeal fades as we begin to examine the public’s attitudes. 
The public, after all, often engages in issues of crime and punishment in the context 
of specific crimes and offenders, and rarely over statistics and trends.76 Moreover, 
when faced with a notorious crime, the public’s initial response is, not infrequently, 
emotional and, thus, retributive in nature. This is particularly so for the most graphic 
and violent crimes, which make the most “gripping mental TV.”77 
The retributive orientation is amplified further by the dramatic role that the 
media plays in the public’s perception of criminal justice matters. News outlets focus 
on the most disturbing crimes because that is what tends to sell, and these incessant 
stories create a background sense of danger and fear.78 In this way, the modern media 
                                                                                                            
“standard” sentences in a field where few cases are standard. Significant discretion will 
remain in the trial courts to determine when deviations are appropriate, and those deviations 
will reintroduce the same concerns about trial-court decision-making mentioned above. The 
debate over this approach to sentencing is an interesting one, though at this point it is largely 
academic. For more on the idea of a common-law approach to sentencing, see Douglas 
Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for 
Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 93 (1999). 
 76. See Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 748–49 
(2005) (“Cognitive psychology teaches that when voters think of crime and sentencing, they 
tend to think of examples of crimes that are most salient.”); W.C. Bunting, The Regulation of 
Sentencing Decisions: Why Information Disclosure Is Not Sufficient, and What To Do About 
It, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 41, 51–52 (2014) (“A substantial empirical literature shows, 
however, that voters are not particularly well informed about criminal justice matters, 
especially optimal sentence lengths. Voters, for example, tend to recall only the most salient 
examples of crime—most often violent crimes.”). 
 77. Greene, supra note 59, at 1017. 
 78. See Barkow, supra note 76, at 749–51. 
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has a pernicious effect, reducing policy debates about crime to sensationalism, while 
stoking emotions about widespread disorder.79 
The public’s retributive orientation is picked up by legislators, who tend to 
act in response to the public’s outcry over crime. One might hope that legislators 
deliberate and reflect on the validity of the public’s sentiment, keeping in mind the 
broader policy effects of their decisions. But there is little incentive for legislators 
to do so. As a result, legislative action on sentencing often occurs in quick response 
to certain high-profile, widely publicized crimes, often without any substantive 
discussion at all.80 
In short, the legislature has certain structural features that are appealing, 
including its broad perspective on social issues and its responsibility for making 
general, forward-looking rules for punishment. But its initial appeal is offset by its 
political sensitivity, which makes it highly responsive to the public’s passions about 
crime and punishment. That sensitivity makes the legislature an unreliable candidate 
to serve as an institution committed to utilitarian objectives. 
4. Parole Board 
The fourth institution—the parole board—might also seem well-suited to 
promoting the utilitarian mission. Historically, board members have viewed their 
role as promoting public safety, specifically by assessing whether an offender poses 
a continuing risk to society.81 That general goal would seem to dispose members 
favorably toward a consequentialist approach. 
                                                                                                            
 79. Darley, supra note 74, at 116 (“In the first sections of this article, we suggested 
that most people’s first responses to crimes were automatic and intuitive in character, 
normally driven by just deserts considerations and thus retributive in character . . . . In the 
society of the United States, this natural tendency is amplified by certain cultural forces, such 
as the constant portrayal of violent criminal actions by the entertainment media and the 
television and newspaper news outlets. This contributes to broad-based fear of crime on the 
part of the populace. Further, it creates fear among politicians of appearing ‘soft on crime,’ 
lest some other politician gain advantage when running against them.”); Gerry Stoker, Colin 
Hay & Matthew Barr, Fast Thinking: Implications For Democratic Politics, EUR. J. POL. RES. 
(2015) (“Modern marketing techniques favoured by political elites lead invariably down the 
path of reinforcing the fast thinking mode . . . . It is not that most citizens cannot engage in 
slow thinking . . . . What is in question is how to get citizens to sustain the effort, commitment 
and time required when in that mode . . . .”). 
 80. Perhaps the most notorious example at the federal level is the enactment of 
crack-cocaine penalties after Len Bias’ death, which was widely (and mistakenly) reported to 
be due to a crack overdose. See David Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The 
Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 218 n.49 
(2004). 
 81. Stéphane Mechoulan & Nicolas Sahuguet, Assessing Racial Disparities in 
Parole Release, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 41 (2015) (“[T]he literature suggests that parole boards 
are mostly concerned with avoiding parole violations of released inmates.”); see also Rhine 
et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 279, 299–301 (2017) 
(“A parole board's release decisions should be based on prospective evaluations of whether 
individual prisoners are likely to commit serious crimes in the future.”). 
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At the same time, two structural features of the parole board raise some 
questions about the board’s ultimate commitment to the utilitarian objective. One 
concern is that the parole board, like the judiciary and the jury, confronts individual, 
identifiable offenders (and sometimes victims or their representatives) during parole 
hearings. That direct contact with identifiable offenders likely increases the risk that 
parole boards will adopt a more retributive orientation. 
This concern has been mitigated in recent years as parole boards have taken 
certain steps that create some distance from the individual offenders seeking parole. 
Increasingly, boards have adopted general, forward-looking rules for determining 
when a candidate should be released on parole.82 Typically, these rules are based on 
statistical studies that take into account an offender’s crime, criminal record, and 
other factors in order to predict an offender’s recidivism risk.83 
However, the parole guidelines are not a perfect solution. The guidelines 
are often quite broad, leaving a fair amount of discretion with board members.84 That 
permissiveness in turn may allow retributive considerations to reinfiltrate the 
decision-making process. Nonetheless, even in their current imperfect state, parole 
guidelines provide some help in preserving the general impulse toward utilitarian 
thinking. 
The second objection is more worrisome. It concerns the board’s ability to 
act impartially, free from the retributive impulses of the public at large. At first 
glance, the parole board seems relatively well-protected from public opinion, at least 
compared to the jury or the legislature. That is because the board makes its decisions 
long after an offender has been sentenced, allowing it to operate largely out of the 
public eye and the media’s glare.85 
In practice, however, the board’s political insulation is more qualified. This 
is primarily because of the way board members are selected. Board members tend 
to be appointed by governors, and in most states members can be removed without 
cause.86 As the executive and political branches have moved to adopt tough-on-
crime approaches, parole boards have followed suit.87 Like the legislature, then, 
parole boards may be swayed by the retributive impulses of the public, even if the 
board is formally committed to utilitarian goals of public safety. 
                                                                                                            
 82. Rhine et al., supra note 81, at 299–301 (“A recent survey found that 88 percent 
of paroling authorities report using an actuarial risk prediction instrument to guide decision 
making.”). 
 83. Id. at 300–02 (discussing statistical-prediction tools). 
 84. Id. at 306 (“Despite the appearance of structured decision-making, parole 
guidelines are broadly permissive.”). In theory, of course, more detailed guidelines could be 
implemented, a step that would make the parole rules more similar to sentencing-commission 
guidelines. But such a step would be difficult and costly to implement. 
 85. The principal exceptions are high-profile cases that continue to draw media 
attention, such as the recent parole hearings of Charles Manson’s followers. See, e.g., Melissa 
Etehad, Judge Denies Parole to Former Manson Follower Leslie Van Houten, L.A. TIMES 
(June 29, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-leslie-van-houten-20180629-
story.html. 
 86. Rhine et al., supra note 81, at 286. 
 87. See id. at 287. 
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Parole boards, in short, have distinct advantages over juries, judges, and 
legislatures, including a general disposition to promote public safety. But the parole 
board’s qualified insulation from public opinion, and its direct contact with the 
criminal offender, slightly tarnish the appeal of the institution. 
5. Sentencing Commission 
The final institution, the sentencing commission, has a basic structure that 
seems particularly hospitable to consequentialist thinking. Like the legislature, the 
commission enacts general sentencing rules, rather than imposing sentences on 
specific, identifiable offenders. Further, commissions have a system-wide 
perspective that requires them to consider the costs and benefits of their decisions 
for society at large. These factors likely reduce the emotional impact of the 
sentencing decision, promoting a consequentialist approach. 
The legislature, of course, possesses similar structural features, yet its 
appeal is undercut by its political sensitivity. Do sentencing commissions suffer 
from the same defect? The track record has been mixed. Influential groups, like the 
ALI, have emphasized the need for commissions to act in a nonpartisan, objective 
manner.88 Yet, one of the central critiques of the federal sentencing commission has 
been that it is insufficiently insulated from the political branches.89 Are all 
commissions vulnerable to such a critique? Not necessarily. The truth is that nothing 
about sentencing commissions makes them inherently political or apolitical. The 
degree of political insulation they possess is largely dependent on each 
commission’s specific structure. 
Perhaps the most important structural feature in this regard concerns how 
commission members are appointed to or removed from office. The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, for example, has several membership rules that are designed to curb 
political influence.90 These include establishing long terms in office, requiring 
Senate confirmation for all nominations, permitting no more than four of seven 
members to be drawn from the same political party, permitting removal only for 
“cause,” and requiring staggered appointments to the commission (to prevent the 
appointment of all commission members during the same Presidential term).91 All 
of these features give the Commission some insulation from political pressures.92 
Despite these numerous restrictions, there is one critical area where the 
federal Commission (and, for that matter, every other commission) lacks sufficient 
insulation, and that concerns who can be appointed to the Commission. What kind 
of official is best suited for commission work? Some commentators have argued that 
                                                                                                            
 88. ALI 2007, supra note 30, at 51. 
 89. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1043, 1091–92 (2003); see also Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the 
Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 
7–23 (1991) (discussing various ways the commission is politically motivated). 
 90. For a summary, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368–69 (1989). 
 91. Id. 
 92. The most notable illustration of this is the Commission’s long-standing 
opposition to mandatory-minimum statutes. See supra Subsection I.C.5. 
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commissions should be staffed by politically influential individuals in order to 
ensure that their members can work effectively with the political branches.93 But 
this approach is shortsighted, at least for the utilitarian. Working effectively with 
Congress is an important goal, but not if it means sacrificing political independence. 
For the utilitarian designer, a far more important requirement is to ensure 
that agency members are not overly dependent on, or subservient to, the political 
branches. Appropriately crafted membership requirements can promote that goal. 
To give one obvious approach, a commission that is comprised of life-tenured 
officials would have a much greater degree of political insulation—indeed, 
insulation comparable to that of the federal judiciary. Thus, one approach to ensure 
a high degree of independence would be to require that all sentencing commission 
members be life-tenured judges and appointed to the commission for life (or at least 
very long terms).94 
This approach, of course, would not entirely eliminate the role of politics 
in the commission’s rulemaking. Even life-tenured judges have political allegiances, 
and they may desire higher offices within the judiciary or elsewhere. As a practical 
matter, moreover, the sentencing commission is dependent on the legislature for 
funding and its autonomy. The commission, thus, must be wary of making decisions 
that could trigger a legislative backlash. At the extreme, the commission must take 
into account the risk that the legislature would eliminate the commission entirely 
should the agency act too far outside the mainstream. Nonetheless, one might hope 
that, over time, a relatively independent commission will accrue sufficient political 
capital to withstand the inevitable pressures generated by the political branches.95 In 
doing so, it will be able to fulfill its ultimate role as a broadly independent institution 
within the sentencing system.96 
                                                                                                            
 93. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 76, at 812 (“[T]he key is to place the commission 
in the middle of the political thicket—with legislative membership and legislative 
contacts . . . .”). To be fair, Barkow recognizes that the commission should not be dominated 
by political entities. Id. at 803 (“In order for a commission to bring apolitical judgment and 
rational reflection to its task, it seems that the number of politicians must remain small 
compared to the other members of the commission.”). But she sees politically connected 
individuals as playing an important role in the commission’s decision-making. Id. at 804.  
 94. Cf. ALI 2007, supra note 30, at 63 (“It is desirable that a critical mass of 
experienced judges from the trial and appellate benches serve on the commission.”). 
 95. Id. at 51 (arguing that it is vital for the commission to work toward developing 
institutional capital to withstand pressures from legislatures); ALI 2003, supra note 23, at 70 
(noting that, over time, a sentencing commission can gain credibility and legitimacy that will 
grant it greater independence and leeway for action). 
 96. Coincidentally, in embracing a utilitarian goal more explicitly, a sentencing 
commission may even strengthen its legitimacy. Utilitarianism gives the commission 
something to be an expert about because questions about reducing recidivism risk, predicting 
rehabilitative potential, and assessing deterrent effects all involve a degree of technical skill. 
See supra Section I.B (discussing the range of technical issues raised in a utilitarian 
punishment system). Utilitarianism thus allows the agency to defend its decisions as the 
product of empirical research, rather than political influence or contested claims about an 
offender’s culpability. 
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A carefully structured sentencing commission, in short, may help mitigate 
the risks of politicization, even if it does not eliminate those influences entirely. 
Creating such an institution is an aspiration, even if the idea has not yet been fully 
implemented in practice. Most state commissions include at least one judge as a 
member, but no system is staffed entirely by judges (let alone life-tenured judges).97 
The governing statute for the U.S. Sentencing Commission currently requires at least 
three (of seven) members to be life-tenured judges.98 However, over the 
Commission’s entire history, only a slight majority of commissioners have been 
federal judges at the time of their appointment.99 That is certainly a larger percentage 
of life-tenured judges than any other jurisdiction, but it is well-short of the goal of a 
commission run solely by life-tenured officials. 
In sum, the sentencing-commission model has certain appealing features 
that make it relatively well-designed to promote utilitarian goals. Like the 
legislature, it possesses the emotional distance and system-wide perspective that are 
conducive of utilitarian goals. In contrast to the legislature, though, the commission 
can be structured to reduce the influence of political pressure. The result is an entity 
well-suited for promoting utilitarian goals, or at least better suited than its rivals. 
III. THE COMPETENCE OF UTILITARIAN INSTITUTIONS 
Being committed to utilitarian goals is only one part of what constitutes an 
effective institution. The decision-maker must also have the capability of achieving 
the moral goal, of carrying out the utilitarian calculus consistently and accurately 
over time. That is an unusually challenging requirement. The utilitarian calculus 
requires consideration of a broad range of private and public interests, which in turn 
calls for the use of a comparably diverse set of skills. This Part takes a closer look 
at the kinds of skills utilitarianism demands and then assesses which sentencing 
institution is best equipped to undertake the analysis effectively. 
A. Public and Private Interests 
An effective sentencing institution must possess skills tailored toward 
assessing the specific interests at stake in the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. What 
are those interests? To answer that question, we need to take another—and closer—
look at the basic utilitarian equation. According to that formula, a sentencing 
                                                                                                            
 97. For detailed information on the composition of sentencing commissions 
nationwide, see NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2008), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/files/csi/state_sentencing_guidelines.ashx.  
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2016). The original statute required “at least” three federal 
judges to be appointed to the commission. In 2001, Congress amended the statute to indicate 
that no more than three may be federal judges. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: 
Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1433 n.43 (2008). 
Then in 2010, Congress amended the statute to return it to its original language. PROTECT 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 676. 
 99. Of the 33 past and present commissioners, 18 were federal judges when 
appointed. Former Commission Information, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, 
https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/commisioners/former-commissioner-information 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2018). 
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decision is justified when the good consequences of a decision—i.e., its benefits— 
outweigh the bad consequences—i.e., its costs. Thus: 
Benefits – Costs > 0 
or 
Benefits > Costs. 
The benefit of punishment is principally—though perhaps not 
exclusively—the reduction of crime. This is a public benefit because it accrues to 
the public at large. Punishment can reduce crime through various mechanisms, 
including general deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.100 To determine if a decision is justified, these benefits must be 
weighed against its costs. 
The costs of punishment are also varied. They include the general costs of 
constructing prisons, operating the courts, and running the police. These are public 
costs, in that they are incurred by society as a whole. Of course, there is another cost 
that must be taken into account in the punishment decision—the cost to the 
individual defendant. Utilitarian theory is a radically egalitarian theory; everyone’s 
happiness must be counted equally, regardless of whether the individual is a law-
abiding citizen or a law-breaker.101 In this context, the defendant’s cost is frequently 
significant because punishment typically causes the defendant substantial 
suffering.102 Though it may seem counterintuitive, the cost to the defendant must be 
counted in the analysis. We might refer to this as the private cost of punishment. 
Might prison yield private benefits too? In theory, a defendant could 
experience some benefits from prison life, either because of an unusually pleasant 
prison experience or because prison provides skills or tools that enable the defendant 
to lead a more satisfying life over the long run. Whether these benefits exist in the 
modern prison state is debatable, and even if they do, they are likely to be marginal. 
To simplify matters, I will assume that the private benefits of punishment are not 
significant. Consequently, the only benefit that needs be considered in the utilitarian 
calculus is the public benefit of crime reduction. 
                                                                                                            
 100. Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility 
of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1942 (2010) (“Utilitarian avoidance of crime has 
traditionally been sought through the mechanisms of general and special deterrence, 
incapacitation of the dangerous, and rehabilitation.”).  
 101. Tomislav Bracanovic, Utilitarian Impartiality and Contemporary Darwinism, 
62 FILOZOFIA 14, 14 (2007) (The principle of impartiality “figures prominently in the classic 
versions of utilitarian ethics, especially that advocated by John Stuart Mill, . . . as well as in 
its contemporary versions, such as that advanced by Peter Singer.”); see also JOHN STUART 
MILL, UTILITARIANISM 24 (1861) (“[T]he happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of 
what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As 
between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly 
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”). 
 102. Sonja Starr, On the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Justice Policy: 
A Response to The Imprisoner’s Dilemma, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97, 104 (2013) 
(“[I]ncarceration imposes its most obvious and, in most cases, its most severe harm on the 
prisoner himself.”). 
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Given this discussion, we can rewrite the general punishment equation as 
follows: punishment is justified when the total benefit (principally, the benefit of 
public safety) exceeds the total costs (the sum of private and public costs). In other 
words, 
Public benefits > Public costs + Private costs. 
Grouping the public interests on the left side of the equation, the equation 
becomes: 
Public benefits – Public costs > Private Costs. 
Or, more simply, 
Net Public Benefits > Private Costs. 
In short, punishment is justified when the net public benefits of punishment 
exceed the private cost to the defendant. Punishment is most justified when the 
difference between the two sides of the equation is maximized. 
B. Institutional Competence and Utilitarian Balancing 
Given this range of public and private interests, a sentencing institution 
must possess a correspondingly diverse set of competences. Three are particularly 
notable: technical expertise, empathy, and impartiality. 
First, a sentencing institution must possess a degree of technical expertise. 
Attempts to assess the public-safety benefits of a sentence inevitably involve 
complex judgments about the deterrent effect of punishment, the risk of recidivism, 
and the rehabilitative potential of the defendant. Similarly, attempts to assess the 
public costs of punishment will require some understanding of government finances, 
including the financial costs associated with the courts, police, prison, and other 
entities within the criminal justice system. 
Technical competence is not alone sufficient to ensure that an institution 
can identify the optimal sentence. A second critical competence might be classified 
as a human, rather than technical, skill. It is the ability to empathize with human 
beings who may be very different from the decision-maker. The utilitarian calculus, 
after all, requires consideration of the private costs of punishment, which means a 
decision-maker must be willing and able to take into account the suffering of a 
defendant sentenced to prison. Empathy requires the decision-maker, then, to see 
the essential human worth of every defendant, despite the offender’s possibly 
egregious acts. 
Third, and finally, a sentencing institution must be able to employ these 
skills without being unduly influenced by political pressure or public opinion. This 
too is a challenging requirement because sentencing takes place within a turbulent 
political environment. Given the passions surrounding crime and punishment today, 
the ability to maintain any kind of independence is inevitably difficult. The 
unfortunate result is a skewing of sentencing decisions. Political pressure can lead 
an institution to overstate public benefits or understate the private costs of a 
sentencing decision.103 The results, in such a case, are excessive penalties. The 
                                                                                                            
 103. See infra Section III.C. 
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implication is clear: to ensure an impartial assessment of the interests at stake, a 
sentencing institution must be insulated to some degree from the political passions 
swirling through the criminal justice field. 
C. Assessing the Competence of Sentencing Institutions 
These three competences—technical expertise, empathy, and 
impartiality—are the essential skills of a utilitarian sentencing institution. Lacking 
those skills, an institution’s decisions will be based on speculation or, worse, 
political influence or bias. So how do the traditional sentencing institutions compare 
on these criteria? 
To answer that question, we need to take a closer look at each of the five 
traditional sentencing institutions. In doing so, we will assume for the moment that 
each institution is fully committed to pursuing utilitarian goals. This counterfactual 
assumption allows us to examine the capacity of each institution to assess the 
relevant private and public interests, without concerning ourselves with questions 
about the entity’s commitment to the utilitarian goal. 
1. Jury 
The jury is, once again, a relatively easy case because it is ill-equipped to 
evaluate either the public or private interests at stake in the sentencing decision. 
Starting first with public interests, jurors typically lack expertise in statistics, 
criminology, and other disciplines needed to make informed judgments about the 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitative effects of penalties.104 They also lack 
information about the defendant’s background and character—information 
necessary to make accurate assessments of the defendant’s risk of recidivism.105 
The jury’s lack of expertise in these disciplines makes it particularly 
vulnerable to widespread, often erroneous assumptions about the prevalence of 
criminal activity in society. Public opinion, for example, has succumbed to a general 
and sometimes dramatic fear of crime, even as crime rates have fallen to record-low 
levels.106 This is partly due to the actions of politicians over the past several decades 
who “have used rhetoric, too often racially tinged, to incite concern about public 
safety.”107 Partly, as well, it is due to the effects of modern media, which tends 
                                                                                                            
 104. Oddly, in defending jury sentencing, Iontcheva suggests that sentencing is not 
a technical enterprise. Iontcheva, supra note 24, at 343. That claim might hold true in a 
retributive framework, but it is certainly not correct in a utilitarian system, where questions 
about the public-safety effects of punishment require technical competence to answer. 
 105. Typically, information about the defendant’s background and history cannot 
be offered in jurisdictions that allow jury sentencing. See id. at 366–67. 
 106. Gallup has, for many years, polled Americans about whether there is more 
crime in their area than the year prior. Since 2002, only a minority of respondents have said 
that crime has fallen.  See Crime, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1603/crime.aspx (last 
visited July 29, 2018). Nonetheless, during these time periods, crime rates have fallen 
dramatically and fairly consistently. See United States, CRIME DATA EXPLORER, https://crime-
data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/explorer/violent-
crime?page=crime&placeId=usa&since=2002&until=2016 (last visited July 29, 2018). 
 107. Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion 
about Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (2000). 
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toward the dramatic and dreadful. Media stories inevitably focus on the most horrific 
cases; the repeated, graphic stories about crime have led to a strong emotional 
response by the public.108 That reaction, as previously noted, encourages a 
retributive orientation. But even when individuals continue to hold consequentialist 
goals, these emotions can lead decision-makers to overstate the threat of criminal 
activity and to exaggerate the public benefits of punishment.109 
Jurors will likely fare no better in assessing many of the public costs of 
crime. Those costs—of corrections, law enforcement, and the judiciary—are often 
hidden from the average citizen, who typically has little familiarity with the details 
of government financing. As a result, the public costs are rarely treated as relevant 
factors in the ultimate sentencing decision. Moreover, even if they were taken into 
account, jurors generally have little idea of the precise costs to society in operating 
prisons or the broader criminal justice system (including the cost of jury sentencing 
itself). 
Finally, the jury’s ability to accurately assess the private costs of 
punishment is questionable as well. To be sure, an aspect of the jury’s structure is 
likely to encourage empathy. The jury has direct contact with the accused. In the 
immediacy of the confrontation, the sentencing jury may appreciate that it is dealing 
with a human being, who has been driven to crime for a variety of reasons, not all 
of which are within the defendant’s control.110 This will be particularly true if the 
                                                                                                            
 108. See Anthony C. Thompson, From Sound Bites to Sound Policy: Reclaiming 
the High Ground in Criminal Justice Policy-Making, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 775, 775–89 
(2011); Craig Haney, Riding the Punishment Wave: On the Origins of Our Devolving 
Standards of Decency, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 61–64 (1998).  
 109. Roger Warren, A Tale of Two Surveys: Judicial and Public Perspectives on 
State Sentencing Reform, 21 FED. SENT’G. REP. 276, 279 (2009) (survey highlights how 60% 
of respondents believed crime increased between 1999 and 2005, even as crime rates fell 
13%); cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 510 (2001) (“Surface politics, the sphere in which public opinion and partisan argument 
operate, ebb and flow, just as crime rates ebb and flow. Usually these conventional political 
forces push toward broader liability, but not always, and not always to the same degree. A 
deeper politics, a politics of institutional competition and cooperation, always pushes toward 
broader liability rules, and toward harsher sentences as well.”). 
 110. This conclusion is debatable and tentative. Some research suggests that, under 
certain circumstances, individuals are also more willing to express blame when confronted 
with a concrete offender, compared to an anonymous one. See Kogut, supra note 52, at 1497 
(“The results of the two studies presented suggest complex relationships between the 
identifiability of the wrongdoer and willingness to punish . . . . However, the perspective from 
which the situation is viewed plays a major role in the punishment decision. When taking the 
wrong-doer’s perspective, one is more likely to consider the reasons behind the behaviour or 
the underlying circumstances, hence identification tends to increase pity and understanding 
and decrease anger leading to a lighter punishment. On the other hand, if the perceiver (the 
punisher) was personally hurt by the wrongdoer’s behaviour . . . or takes the injured 
perspective, identification is more likely to increase negative emotions toward the wrongdoer 
and to decrease pity or understanding leading to a more severe punishment.”). In a given case, 
the question is which tendency predominates—whether direct contact with the defendant 
generates more blame or greater sympathy for the individual offender. 
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interaction is coupled with information about the offender’s background that 
humanizes the defendant, thus making his actions seem more sympathetic. 
The positive benefits of this exposure, however, should not be overstated. 
For a variety of reasons, the jury’s empathy for the defendant is likely to be limited, 
especially for the most serious offenders. Individuals have a difficult time 
sympathizing with those considered “other.”111 The defendant, who has transgressed 
against the community and whose background and race may appear foreign to 
members of the jury, is a classic outsider. Popular culture magnifies the 
dehumanizing tendency and often stereotypes offenders as hardened predators.112 
This analysis suggests that jurors, even if they are committed to utilitarian 
goals, are likely to make significant errors in assessing both the public and private 
interests at stake. They will tend to overestimate the social benefits of crime, neglect 
the social costs, and underestimate the individual costs for disfavored offenders. 
These errors all point in the same direction, leading jurors to be more punitive on 
average than what a utilitarian analysis demands. 
2. Legislature 
Legislators are likely to fare only slightly better than jurors in carrying out 
the utilitarian calculus. Individual legislators typically have little technical expertise 
in assessing the public benefits of punishment or the financial costs of the criminal 
justice system. To be sure, legislators often have access to experts who can inform 
them about these matters. But individual legislators may have limited interest in that 
information. Politicians’ incentives lie not so much in “getting the numbers right,” 
as in serving their constituents’ desires. Consequently, when push comes to shove, 
the typical legislator may be more concerned with the public’s views than with 
expert opinion. 
The responsiveness to public opinion is problematic, surfacing many of the 
same defects mentioned in our discussion of the jury. Politicians inevitably respond 
to the public’s fear of crime with harsher penalties, and they are particularly wary 
of being deemed “soft-on-crime.” In some cases, legislators amplify the public’s 
fears, based on the assumption that it is better to err on the side of severity than risk 
being targeted for coddling criminals.113 Again, careful and cautious consideration 
by legislators of empirical data could, in theory, temper the bias toward over-
punishment. But that would require an uncharacteristic commitment to, and interest 
in, considering such data. 
                                                                                                            
 111. Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Emphathy: What Motivates 
People to Help Others?, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 226, 234 (Michael Ross 
& Dale T. Miller eds., 2002) (“Empathic emotions are less likely towards individuals with 
whom we do not feel close or whom we regard as dissimilar to us.”). 
 112. See generally Craig Haney, Demonizing the ‘Enemy’: The Role of “Science” 
in Declaring the ‘War on Prisoners’, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185 (2010) (discussing process 
of demonizing criminal offenders); Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral 
State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259 (2011) (similar). 
 113. See Aaron Rappaport, What the Supreme Court Should Do, 17 FED. SENT. R. 
46, 47 n.6 (2004) (“A range of commentators have discussed the distorting influence of 
legislative politics on criminal lawmaking.”) (collecting citations). 
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One might hope that legislators are more inclined than jurors to consider 
the public costs of punishment, because it is the legislature’s express responsibility 
to fund criminal justice activities. In practice, though, a misalignment of incentives 
makes it unlikely that a legislator will engage in an unbiased assessment of financial 
costs. Legislators, after all, tend to have a short-term focus, driven by their need to 
run for reelection. That creates an incentive for legislators to avoid paying the full 
cost of their proposals up front, at least not if they can get away with deferring those 
costs into the future. In the case of proposals to increase sentences, the opportunity 
to do just that exists. The full financial impact of these proposals may not occur for 
many years to come. For example, a proposal to increase the sentence for a given 
crime from six years to ten will not incur additional costs until at least six years from 
the effective date of the proposal.114 
To be sure, at some point the bill for the increased penalty will come due. 
But legislators can push off the full costs of corrections for years through the 
issuance of general obligation and lease revenue bonds.115 This tactic is not cost-
free: states must still pay interest on the bonds each year, and they must also be 
concerned with the impact of debt financing on the state’s overall credit ratings.116 
But the effect of those considerations is indirect and gradual.117 The impact is even 
more attenuated at the federal level, where criminal justice spending is a relatively 
small part of the overall budget.118 Absent some mechanism to force legislators to 
internalize the costs of their sentencing proposals at the time of passage, the 
temptation to defer payments will be significant.119 
                                                                                                            
 114. For further discussion of this effect, see Bunting, supra note 76, at 53–56. 
 115. See HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 45–46 (2015) (discussing use of debt financing 
to pay for increased incarceration). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Even in states with balanced-budget amendments, politicians are able to enact 
tough-on-crime laws without requiring off-setting appropriations. Costs can be deferred to 
future years by issuing bonds that are paid back over time. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 1 (2010) (“Bond 
finance for capital projects, the purpose of which is borrowing against future revenues, is 
generally not considered by policymakers to fall within any constraints of a balanced budget 
requirement.”). 
 118. The budget for the Department of Justice in 2017 was $29 billion. Fact Sheet 
2017, DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/822511/download (last visited July 
29, 2018). The total federal budget that year was approximately $4 trillion. The Federal 
Budget In 2017: An Infographic, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=115th-congress-2017-2018/graphic/53624-
fy17federalbudget.pdf. 
 119. Some states have experimented with legislative mechanisms designed to bring 
attention to the costs of tough-on-crime legislation, such as the requirement that an “impact 
statement” be attached to any bill that increases penalties. See, e.g., Bunting, supra note 76, 
at 57–58 (“At least fourteen states have established, by law, special requirements for fiscal 
notes written in connection with criminal justice legislation . . . . Some states additionally 
require that the fiscal note be accompanied by a ‘prison impact statement,’ ‘population impact 
statement,’ or ‘correctional resources statement.’”). The effectiveness of such efforts is 
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Lastly, the legislature is poorly situated to consider the private costs of 
punishment. In some ways, the legislature is in an even more disadvantaged position 
than the jury. Unlike jurors, legislators have little or no direct contact with the 
offender being sentenced. That distance makes it easier to view the defendant as an 
abstraction and harder to see the offender as a person of moral worth and 
significance. The emotional distance also makes legislators more prone to accept 
negative stereotypes promulgated by the media and other sources.120 Again, such 
stereotyping will be more significant for high-profile and egregious crimes, which 
tend to inflame the public’s passions. The prominence of those cases—and the 
horror of the crimes—focuses attention on the worst kinds of offenders. 
To make matters worse, legislators have few personal incentives to 
consider the defendant’s viewpoint. Inmates are barred from voting in all but two 
states.121 In many states, ex-felons also face restrictions.122 For all of these reasons, 
legislators are even less likely than jurors to take full account of the private costs of 
punishment. 
The bottom line is that legislators are unlikely to carry out the utilitarian 
calculus accurately or impartially. The institution will tend to overstate the public 
benefits of punishment and to underestimate the costs. The end result is that the 
legislature, like the jury, will skew sentencing decisions toward excessive 
severity.123 
3. Judiciary 
Like the jury and legislature, the judiciary typically lacks the technical 
competence to make accurate assessments of the public interests at stake in the 
punishment decision. Though some are exceptionally knowledgeable, judges are not 
expected to be conversant with the latest social-science research regarding 
recidivism or deterrence. The judiciary is also poorly situated to estimate the public 
costs of punishment, such as the costs of law enforcement and corrections. While 
                                                                                                            
disputed, but it is unlikely to be significant without a requirement that a funding mechanism 
be passed along with any sentencing legislation. Id. at 58–62. 
 120. Thus, one way to counteract this kind of bias is to provide direct contact with 
individuals who believe the negative stereotype. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in 
the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1169 (2012) (“If we have a particular stereotype 
about some group, we need exposure to members of that group that do not feature those 
particular attributes.”). 
 121. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON & SARAH SHANNON, SENTENCING 
PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT (Oct. 2016). 
 122. Id. 
 123. This analysis has repercussions beyond the immediate sentencing decision. 
Because the legislature tends to give short shrift to the private costs of punishment, one might 
also expect pervasive problems in the housing and care of inmates, as well as other services 
designed to ensure a minimum level of human dignity for prisoners. That prediction has been 
borne out in various states, such as California, which have been subject to court orders 
because of substandard prison care. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and 
Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165 
(discussing prison litigation in California and other states). 
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judges have more familiarity with these issues than jurors, it seems doubtful they 
can make accurate assessments of these factors consistently over time. 
On a more positive note, judges appear relatively well-positioned to take 
the defendant’s own interests into account. Like jurors, sentencing judges have 
direct exposure to the defendant in the dock, along with at least some access to 
information about the defendant’s background and circumstances.124 In that regard, 
they will be less prone to see the defendant as an abstraction, and correspondingly 
less likely to completely ignore the defendant’s suffering.125 
One might also hope that, given their culture and history of 
professionalism, judges are less susceptible to the kind of stereotyping that infects 
legislative and jury decision-making. Judicial practice may help too. Historically, 
the courts have stood as the defender of private interests, and courts have at least 
some familiarity with vindicating broader moral, political, and legal principles 
against majority passions directed at despised members of the community.126 
Perhaps most important of all is a key distinguishing feature of the federal 
judiciary: its relative insulation from public opinion. The insulation means that 
members of the judiciary are far less prone to be swept up in the public’s clamor for 
tough-on-crime decisions, and they are more willing to consider the humanity of the 
defendant without excessive stereotyping. 
These initial observations suggest that life-tenured judges will have a far 
different profile than legislators and juries. The judiciary will be less caught up in 
the tough-on-crime hysteria of the day, making it less willing to overstate the net 
benefits of punishment. It will also be more attentive to the offender’s interests and 
                                                                                                            
 124. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For The 
People: Notes For the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 28 (2008) 
(“Judges on higher appellate courts deal primarily in legal abstractions; they are less likely to 
consider the particular needs of individuals. By contrast, the trial judge--and jury--is in the 
presence of the individuals the laws affect. They have a stronger sense of how a ruling will 
influence the lives of the parties, their families, and their communities.”). 
 125. This point is certainly debatable. One might argue, on the other side, that 
judges over time will become inured to the defendant’s “excuses,” while jurors might be more 
open to hearing the offender’s explanations. See King & Noble, supra note 34, at 951 (quoting 
prosecutor who asserts that judges become “calloused” over time and start “comparing the 
case in front of them to the worse they’ve ever seen, and the sentences keep getting lighter.”). 
  Another counterbalancing factor is that the judiciary may be exposed to the 
injuries suffered by the victim, and that may, in turn, trigger feelings of anger and vengeance 
toward the defendant. For serious crimes, the judiciary may even hear from the victim’s 
family and friends about the suffering that they experienced. Whether judges can remain 
dispassionate in the face of such images and testimony remains an open question. 
 126. That is not to say that judges will be unaffected by bias. Judges, as members 
of society, share the cultural biases of the community at large to some degree. During the 
indeterminate era, empirical research underscored just how much bias infected judicial 
sentencing. See Eric S. Fish, Criminal Law Sentencing and Interbranch Dialogue, 105 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 549, 561–62 (2015) (discussing studies). The point is not that 
judges are philosopher kings, only that judges are more likely to consider the defendant’s 
interests than the legislature is. 
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needs, ensuring that the private costs of punishment will, on average, be more 
prominent. The impartiality will not make the punishment decision more accurate, 
but it will make judges less prone to the temptation of excessive severity. 
These trends yield a prediction—that over time a life-tenured judiciary that 
is committed to utilitarian goals will be less punitive than either juries or legislatures 
pursuing the same objectives.127 Although this prediction is extremely difficult to 
test empirically, some anecdotal evidence exists to support the claim. For example, 
the idea that judges are less punitive than juries seems to be conventional wisdom 
in states where jury sentencing is an option.128 This is true even in states where 
judges are elected.129 Similarly, at the federal level, judges and legislatures have 
exhibited sharply divergent views on the merits of statutes imposing long 
mandatory-minimum penalties on drug offenders and others. Many politicians find 
mandatories to be an appealing, easy method of sending a message that crime does 
                                                                                                            
 127. Not everyone agrees that an indeterminate sentencing regime (where judges 
play a dominant role) is likely to be less punitive than determinate sentencing models. Kevin 
Reitz, for example, has highlighted the sentencing severity of states with indeterminate 
models compared to those with determinate ones. After reviewing the literature on the subject, 
Reitz concludes: “Indeterminate sentencing systems, of the kind recommended in the original 
Model Penal Code, have been the primary engines of U.S. prison growth since the 1970s.” 
ALI 2007, supra note 30, at xxxi n.7. For a concise literature survey, see Kevin R. Reitz, The 
American Experiment: Crime Reduction Through Prison Growth, 4:3 EUROPEAN J. ON CRIM. 
POL’Y & RES. 74 (1996); see also Kevin R. Reitz, Don’t Blame Determinacy: U.S. 
Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1794–1801 
(2006); Kevin R. Reitz, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom of Parole Release Authority, 
in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 199, 217–28 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004). 
  The applicability of that research to our discussion, however, is not entirely 
clear. Studies of indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions often focus on states with elected 
judges, which makes the comparison less relevant. Moreover, regimes that embrace 
indeterminate sentencing may have been affected by many factors besides institutional 
structure, such as changes in legislatively enacted sentencing laws or parole-board rules. 
Ultimately, changes in the local culture might drive changes across the board for all 
institutions, which would make it hard to identify the specific effect of institutional structure 
on sentencing decisions. 
 128. In those states, jury sentencing is seen as a kind of check on the excessive 
leniency of judges. See King & Noble, supra note 34, at 941 (“The more important reason to 
support jury sentencing is its leveling effect on judges. The perception of the prosecutor is 
that the judges are too lenient, and most people probably think judges are more lenient, but 
not always. The jury keeps them in line.”). 
 129. At present, a few researchers have attempted to assess whether juries are more 
punitive than judges. The most thorough study to date suggests jurors are more severe. See 
id. at 895–96. Other studies show conflicting results. See Iontcheva, supra note 24, at 361. 
But all of these studies involve states with elected judges and so are not immediately relevant 
to our prediction. If elected judges are found to be less punitive than jurors in the same 
community, one would expect that life-tenured judges would be even more so. 
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not pay.130 But mandatories have also been sharply criticized by members of the 
judiciary who see them as blunt, overly-punitive proposals.131 
Of course, even if judges are less punitive than juries or legislatures on 
average, that does not mean that judges are well-situated to identify the optimal 
sentence under a utilitarian system of punishment. The courts’ incapacity to make 
accurate assessments of the public and private interests at stake will increase the 
chances that their punishment decisions will be inaccurate, if not excessively lenient. 
The judiciary, in short, also exhibits serious deficiencies in carrying out the 
utilitarian calculus. 
4. Parole Board 
Parole boards appear to have one distinct advantage over other institutions 
discussed so far: promoting public safety has long been a focus of their efforts, and 
they have developed some expertise and quite a bit of experience in pursuing that 
goal. In particular, parole boards have long focused on assessing the defendant’s 
likely recidivism risk upon release.132 This task was initially based on clinical 
assessments by parole commissioners, at least some of whom were trained in 
psychology and human behavior.133 In recent decades, doubts have grown about 
clinicians’ ability to make consistently accurate assessments of risk.134 That 
criticism has motivated parole boards to incorporate “evidence-based” approaches 
to assessing risk, typically relying upon statistical studies to develop algorithms that 
                                                                                                            
 130. Tonry, supra note 32, at 69. 
 131. See Paul Cassell, Statement on Behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States from U.S. District Judge Paul Cassell before the House Judiciary Committee 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 344, 345 
(2007) (observing that “scores of federal judges” have condemned mandatory-minimum 
terms). 
 132. See supra note 81, and accompanying text. 
 133. Iontcheva, supra note 24, at 326 n.80. As an added advantage, parole boards 
have historically had access to important and relevant information about the defendant not 
available to other institutions. Notably, because they make sentencing decisions after the 
defendant has typically served a portion of his or her sentence, the parole board can consider 
information about the defendant’s conduct in prison, such as whether the offender has 
discipline violations, or taken advantage of appropriate rehabilitation services (such as drug 
treatment or job-training programs). Ilyana Kuziemko, Going Off Parole: How the 
Elimination of Discretionary Prison Release Affects the Social Cost of Crime 31 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 1380, 2007) (“[P]arole boards have access to 
information revealed after sentencing and therefore may be better than judges at forcasting 
[sic] inmates’ expected recidivism risk.”). One might imagine that this information, which 
offers a more recent picture of the defendant’s conduct, would be relevant in any assessment 
of an offender’s risk of recidivism. Nonetheless, as several leading researchers recently 
observed, “[a] sparse body of research has produced mixed results on the relationship between 
misconduct in prison and recidivism.” Rhine et al., supra note 81, at 310. 
 134.  See Rhine et al., supra note 81, at 300 (“Early parole hearings were often 
haphazard, based primarily on brief interviews with each prisoner. Parole boards were guided 
by their experiences and gut-level instincts (referred to as “clinical” assessments). But studies 
of such methods revealed that the predictive validity of clinical assessments was inferior to 
more structured actuarial methods.” (citation omitted)). 
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can predict the likelihood that a criminal will reoffend.135 The hope is that these 
empirically based rules will improve the accuracy of parole decisions.136 
The board’s apparent expertise in assessing recidivism risk gives it a leg up 
over its competitors in measuring the public benefits of punishment, but that 
advantage is qualified. The first limitation is that the parole board’s focus on 
recidivism risk neglects other potential benefits of punishment, such as its deterrent 
effect. To the extent that the neglected effects are significant, the parole board’s 
analysis of public benefits will be incomplete. In addition, the parole board is limited 
in its ability to make accurate assessments of the public costs of punishment. Parole 
boards do not typically consider those costs in making their parole decisions, and 
they are almost never an explicit part of the parole boards’ calculi.137 
For both reasons, a parole board’s assessment of the net public benefits of 
punishment is likely to be inaccurate. What about its ability to measure the private 
costs of a sentence? Certain features of the parole board’s structure might be 
conducive to feelings of empathy, at least under the right conditions. Notably, like 
the judiciary and jury, the parole board confronts the defendant directly. Given its 
position within the prison system, the parole board also has a unique sense of the 
deprivations the offender has faced during incarceration. Finally, to the extent some 
parole boards continue to be comprised of social workers or therapists, the board 
might be disposed to consider the hardships experienced by criminal offenders in 
prison. 
This initial assessment suggests that the parole board is much better 
situated to assess the private costs of punishment than the net public benefits. That 
appealing feature, however, is tempered by countervailing factors that tend to harden 
board members against criminal offenders. Perhaps most significant is the 
politicization of parole boards. 
As noted previously, the parole board is likely to be somewhat sensitive to 
political pressures, in part because of the way board members are appointed.138 
                                                                                                            
 135. See supra note 81. 
 136. Researchers have offered reasons to believe this optimism may be well-
founded. See, e.g., Jeremy Isard, Under the Cloak Of Brain Science: Risk Assessments, 
Parole, And The Powerful Guise Of Objectivity, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2017) 
(“According to a seminal meta-analysis . . . mechanical prediction techniques and statistical 
actuarial tools—across medicine, finance, and criminal justice—are about 10 percent more 
accurate than clinical judgment when predicting human behavior.”). At the same time, 
questions persist about the accuracy of the algorithms used in punishment decisions. See 
Rhine et al., supra note 81, at 300 (noting that even one of the most successful algorithms—
called LSI-R—has a 30% false-positive rate). Doubts have been raised, as well, about the 
accuracy of the inputs used in the algorithm. Id. at 303–04. And significant concerns exist that 
risk variables might be unduly correlated with race and class. Id. at 301–02. 
 137. See, e.g., W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 395, 397–400 (2011) (discussing California parole board’s failure to consider 
cost issues). 
 138. See supra Subsection I.C.4. The politicized nature of parole decisions is 
exacerbated in states like California, where the Governor retains the power to reverse parole 
decisions. In the past, that power has been used to impose a highly punitive approach to parole 
 
2018] DESIGN OF PUNISHMENT 951 
Members are also less likely to be drawn from the social-work or psychology 
professions, and much more likely to be picked from the ranks of probation officers 
and correctional officials.139 These factors contribute to a more law-and-order 
orientation, skewing the board’s assessment of the offender’s threat to society.140 As 
a result, parole boards my ultimately deny parole to individuals, even in situations 
where the benefits of release outweigh the risks.141 This same orientation can harden 
the board’s views of the defendant, making it less willing to appreciate the 
offender’s basic humanity. 
In sum, the parole board has a distinct advantage over the three institutions 
discussed before. Unlike the jury, legislature, and judiciary, the parole board has at 
least some expertise in assessing a key mechanism for promoting public safety—the 
recidivism risk of the defendant. However, the parole board also exhibits serious 
deficiencies. Its focus on recidivism risk ignores other mechanisms for promoting 
public safety. It has limited expertise in assessing the costs of punishment. And it 
lacks the same kind of independence possessed by federal judges, making it 
vulnerable to political pressures and neglectful of the defendant’s liberty interests. 
The parole board may be superior to the jury and legislature in carrying out the 
utilitarian calculus, but it is hardly the ideal structure for sentencing offenders in a 
utilitarian punishment system. 
                                                                                                            
decisions, with only a small fraction of those approved by the parole board being released. 
See Kathryne M. Young, Debbie A. Mukamal & Thomas Favre-Bulle, Predicting Parole 
Grants: An Analysis of Suitability Hearings for California’s Lifer Inmates, 28 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 268, 270 (2016) (“[F]rom 1999-2011, even in the few cases where [the parole board] 
found an inmate suitable for parole release, Governors . . . usually reversed grants.”). 
 139. Rhine et al., supra note 81, at 286 (“The majority of states specify at most 
vague educational requirements or relevant work experience.”); see also Stefan J. Bing, Note, 
Reconsidering State Parole Board Membership Requirements in Light Of Model Penal Code 
Sentencing Revisions, 100 KY. L.J. 871, 877 (2011–2012) (“Generally, most parole board 
members have served in the corrections system as a corrections officer, warden, parole 
officer, probation officer, or in another capacity.”) 
 140. Kevin R. Reitz, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom of Parole Release 
Authority, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 199, 206 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (discussing 
how parole boards have become increasingly risk averse in their release decisions).   
 141. W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV 
395, 398 n.8 (2011) (“[T]he parole board, so long as it is at least 
indirectly politically accountable, will systematically under-release prisoners according 
to political criteria that are divorced from an actual cost-benefit calculation.”). To be sure, the 
use of algorithms to help determine release dates provides some counterbalance to this 
orientation. See Rhine  et al., supra note 81, at 301 (“Actuarial tools also help insulate decision 
making from politicization and, since the process is more objective, reduce the number of 
legal appeals due to adverse parole decision making.”). But the algorithms do not completely 
eliminate the boards’ discretion in choosing release dates. See, e.g., Kimberly Thomas & Paul 
Reingold, From Grace to Grids: Rethinking Due Process Protection for Parole, 107 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213, 244 (2017) (With parole algorithms, “there are still value judgments 
at play—such as how much risk is tolerable. Further, in these judgments, some suggest that 
parole boards still ‘err on the side of severity.’”). 
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5. Sentencing Commission 
The sentencing commission is the final institutional option. At least at first 
glance, it offers significant advantages in evaluating both the public and private 
interests at stake. Consider the public benefits first. 
Sentencing commissions can possess significant technical skill in assessing 
the public-safety effects of punishment. Commissions are commonly conceived as 
expert agencies charged with taking into account the latest research on 
punishment.142 Moreover, unlike the parole board’s focus on recidivism issues, 
sentencing commissions can adopt a broad, system-wide approach that encourages 
consideration of the full range of public-safety concerns.143 In some jurisdictions, 
commissions are staffed with highly trained experts, including statisticians and other 
research scientists.144 
The primary obstacle commissions face in assessing the public benefits of 
punishment has been the “shortfall in quality research on the effectiveness of 
criminal sanctions in reducing crime.”145 Nonetheless, sentencing commissions are 
well-positioned to make the best use of the available information. Moreover, in some 
jurisdictions, commissions are tasked with actively promoting and supporting new 
research initiatives.146 
Turning to the public costs of crime, sentencing commissions appear to 
have comparable advantages. An effective institution must account for the full range 
of costs incurred by the government, including the costs of prison, correctional 
personnel, and the court system.147 Only an institution like the commission—with 
                                                                                                            
 142. Barkow, supra note 76, at 717 (“One stated justification for relying on an 
agency was that it would allow a group of experts to set policy based on the best knowledge 
available, as opposed to the political winds.”); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in 
Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 69, 75 (1999) (“[State sentencing] commissions have begun to develop useful 
sentencing policy expertise, a comprehensive statewide view of punishment priorities, better 
management of resources, and a long-term perspective.”); Richard P. Conaboy, The United 
States Sentencing Commission: A New Component in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 
61 FED. PROBATION 58, 62 (1997) (“As an independent, expert agency, the Commission’s role 
is to develop sentencing policy on the basis of research and reason.”). 
 143. See ALI 2003, supra note 23, at 66–71.  
 144. See ALI 2007, supra note 30, at 90 for discussion of the importance of this 
feature. 
 145. See id. at 33, 96; see also ALI 2003, supra note 23, at 106 (discussing 
importance of improved information). In any event, saying that we lack any guidance or 
research is mistaken. Efforts to develop more accurate tools for predicting recidivism risk, for 
example, continue. See ALI 2007, supra note 30, at 34 (noting that some progress has been 
seen in assessing recidivism risks). 
 146. For discussion of this research objective, see ALI 2007, supra note 30, at 21, 
42. 
 147. See ALI 2007, supra note 30, at 85 (“The commission’s work . . . carries 
enormous budgetary implications for state and local governments. A well-functioning 
commission can do much to ensure that public resources are deployed in an effective and 
cost-efficient manner.”). 
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its system-wide perspective and with some expertise in accounting and related 
disciplines—will be able to gather and analyze these various data streams.148 The 
agency is also positioned to take account of cost issues relating to prison capacity.149 
Sentencing commissions may not yet fulfill these tasks with complete success—
anecdotal evidence suggests that commissions look at the cost side only 
occasionally—but the institution is the candidate with the best potential to carry out 
the task effectively. 
The sentencing commission’s ability to assess the private costs of 
punishment is more questionable. Like legislatures, commissions operate at a 
distance from individual offenders, potentially leading agency members to treat 
offenders as abstractions, without the full appreciation for the unique self-worth of 
the lives at stake. This danger can be mitigated somewhat by appropriately crafted 
membership rules. For example, a commission comprised of a panel of trial judges 
would be far less vulnerable to this critique. Trial judges have extensive experience 
confronting offenders in their ordinary sentencing decisions. One might hope that 
this experience would ensure that judges understand that they are dealing not with 
abstractions, but with real human beings.150 
The final consideration in assessing the commission’s competence is its 
ability to weigh the public and private interests in an impartial, unbiased way. How 
does the commission fare on this metric? For many observers, the answer is: not 
particularly well. Commissions have been criticized for being overly political.151 
Justice Scalia famously denounced the federal Sentencing Commission for being 
merely a “junior varsity Congress.”152 Despite this critique, it is a mistake to 
conclude that sentencing commissions are inherently sensitive to political pressure. 
The degree of independence they enjoy depends on their structure and membership. 
As mentioned previously, the federal Sentencing Commission possesses 
several structural features—such as removal only for cause—that help ensure that it 
has a degree of political insulation.153 That insulation would be dramatically 
strengthened by requiring all commission members to be life-tenured judges. This 
change would not eliminate all political influence, but it would significantly reduce 
                                                                                                            
 148. For discussion of system-wide policymaking, see ALI 2003, supra note 23, at 
66. 
 149. Commissions, of course, do not have direct control over prison capacity. 
Nonetheless, the commission could highlight for the legislature the costs incurred in new 
sentencing legislation. That, alone, may have some effect on the legislative process. For 
discussion of “correctional resource management,” see ALI 2007, supra note 30, at 19–20, 
40–42, 168–69. One of the first tasks for the sentencing commission, according to the ALI, is 
to develop a “correctional population forecasting model.” Id. at 93. For discussion of resource 
management, see ALI 2003, supra note 23, at 72. 
 150. Though much more controversial, a commission with significant participation 
from criminal-defense attorneys or prison-rights advocates would achieve the goal even more 
effectively, though perhaps at the expense of undermining objectivity about other factors in 
the utilitarian calculus. 
 151. See Rappaport, supra note 89, at 1120–21. 
 152. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 153. See supra note 90, and accompanying text. 
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its significance. Over time, as the Commission gains legitimacy and political capital, 
it will have further leeway to act on its own judgments without interference.154 
The analysis suggests that a properly structured sentencing commission—
one that is comprised of life-tenured trial judges—would be well-equipped to weigh 
the costs and benefits of punishment.155 In contrast to the legislature, it would not 
overstate the public interests of punishment, nor give short shrift to public or private 
costs. In contrast to the judiciary, it would not be tempted to neglect public interests 
in its focus on private ones. Under this analysis, a sentencing commission would 
represent the least-imperfect alternative among the traditional sentencing 
institutions. The analysis also makes clear that the appeal of a sentencing 
commission depends fundamentally on how it is structured. To gain the full benefits 
of the commission approach, it is essential that the appropriate institutional 
                                                                                                            
 154. See ALI 2003, supra note 23, at 70 (noting that over time, a sentencing 
commission can gain credibility and legitimacy that will allow it greater independence); see 
also ALI 2007, supra note 30, at 51 (stating that it is critical for the Commission to work 
toward developing institutional capital over time so that it can withstand pressures from 
political branches). 
 155. This conclusion offers a further important prediction: assuming that the 
institutions are committed to utilitarian goals, a well-structured sentencing commission will 
be somewhat less punitive than the legislature, and somewhat more punitive than the 
judiciary. Unfortunately, testing that hypothesis is impossible at this time for two fundamental 
reasons. First, there is no certainty that all three institutions are committed to pursuing 
utilitarian goals. Second, we do not have an example of a well-structured sentencing 
commission in existence; we only have the imperfect example of the partially politicized U.S. 
Sentencing Commission. 
  Nonetheless, is it worth noting that, despite the methodological problems in 
making the assessment, there is some reason to believe that the institutional prediction is 
correct. The leniency of the U.S. Sentencing Commission relative to the Congress is 
suggested by several Commission acts. For example, the federal Commission has criticized 
Congress for enacting mandatory-minimum statutes, along with several other punitive 
initiatives. See generally, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2011). More concretely, the 
Commission has enacted several rules that impose less severe penalties than the identical 
enhancements set forth in the mandatory-minimum statutes. The most obvious example is the 
enhancement for use of a gun. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2016) (mandatory 
sentence of five or more years for use of a gun), with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2016) (two-
level sentence enhancement). 
  The evidence that the Commission is more punitive than the judiciary is more 
anecdotal, but still compelling. Federal judges historically have viewed the Commission’s 
rules as being overly severe. In accord with that view, judges depart downward from the 
guidelines with much greater frequency than they vary upward. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
REP. TO THE CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 32 fig. 1 (Oct. 2003). That trend has persisted after the Booker decision made 
Commission rules advisory. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REP. ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 69 (2012) (after Booker decision, rate 
of below-guideline sentences increased further). These findings suggest that judges view the 
guidelines as overly punitive and have used their departure power to impose penalties more 
in line with their own judgments. 
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safeguards be erected to protect the commission from the inevitable political 
pressures that will be brought to bear on it over time. 
IV. A SHARED POWER 
This analysis suggests that a properly structured sentencing commission is 
the best candidate to satisfy the two key requirements of a utilitarian punishment 
institution. It is the entity most likely to be committed to utilitarian objectives, and 
it is the institution most capable of achieving those objectives consistently over time. 
If this is correct, a sentencing commission should be the primary decision-maker in 
the punishment realm. But whether it should be the only decision-maker is another 
question entirely. It is worth considering whether the commission’s power should 
be exclusive, or whether it should be shared with one or more secondary institutions. 
Pragmatic reasons militate for a shared power. If the commission were the 
only sentencing institution, it would be responsible for enacting rules to account for 
every factor that might be relevant in the sentencing decision (and for every possible 
way such factors might appear). Given the range of potentially relevant factors at 
sentencing, this would create an extraordinarily complex system, one that would be 
unworkable to implement in practice. It would also impose an exceptionally heavy 
burden on commission rulemaking.156 
A shared-power approach would avoid this problem and arguably prove 
superior. Under this alternative approach, the sentencing commission would not try 
to account for all relevant factors. Rather, it would adopt rules for only the most 
significant ones, and its rules would permit a range of sentencing outcomes. The 
choice of punishment within that range would be left to the secondary institution. In 
carrying out that responsibility, the secondary institution would examine additional 
facts about the offense and offender and then, based on those further considerations, 
choose where within the range a sentence should be imposed (or, in exceptional 
cases, whether a departure from the range would be justified). This is truly a 
sentencing system of shared powers, with the commission taking the primary role in 
defining the sentencing range, and the secondary institution fine-tuning the sentence 
within that range.157 
Which institution should serve as the secondary sentencing entity? Ideally, 
the institution would be the next-most-effective entity (after a sentencing 
                                                                                                            
 156. To be sure, it would be possible to create general rules without undue 
complexity—by ignoring relevant differences among offenders. For example, the 
commission could impose the same penalty on broad categories of criminals, ignoring 
differences in the criminal conduct, or in the defendant’s background. This approach, 
however, would result in a kind of sentencing disparity, in which dissimilarly situated 
offenders are treated similarly. Administrative convenience would be gained at the cost of 
excessive uniformity. 
 157. The idea of a complex sentencing scheme is hardly novel. Historically, in the 
sentencing field, power has been distributed broadly among different institutions. In 
indeterminate schemes, for example, sentencing discretion has been shared among 
legislatures, judges, parole boards, and other entities. In typical guideline regimes, too, 
sentencing power has been shared among commissions and other entities—notably, judges. 
Thus, complex sentencing schemes are the norm, not the exception. 
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commission) in promoting utilitarian goals. The legislature and the jury, as a result, 
can be immediately excluded from the list. Both entities are deeply problematic 
candidates, because they both tend to favor retributive considerations, and both lack 
the expertise and independence needed to serve as an effective sentencing 
institution.158 
That leaves the judiciary and the parole board. The choice between them is 
not obvious. Each offers its own advantages and disadvantages. The federal 
judiciary offers greater independence, while the parole board has greater technical 
expertise in relevant areas (such as risk assessment) and also seems more likely to 
adopt a utilitarian orientation. A plausible argument could be made under these 
circumstances for either institution. Nonetheless, several additional factors tip the 
balance in favor of the judiciary. 
First, the parole board is handicapped by its position at the back-end of the 
sentencing system. The board typically makes its sentencing decisions only after the 
offender has served a portion of the ultimate sentence.159 By that time, it may be too 
late to determine if a downward departure is warranted, because the defendant might 
have already served longer than the justified sentence.160 
Second, the parole board’s involvement might exacerbate, rather than 
mitigate, certain biases built into a commission approach. We have already seen that 
sentencing commissions typically depart from the preferred institutional structure, 
principally because they are usually not staffed by life-tenured judges. In that 
situation, one might expect the commission to be swayed somewhat by the tough-
on-crime attitudes infusing the criminal justice field, which would skew the 
commission’s decisions toward excessive punitiveness. Ideally, then, a secondary 
sentencing institution would compensate for that defect, by erring on the side of 
leniency.161 
                                                                                                            
 158. The legislature is problematic for an additional reason: any institution that can 
fill the role of a secondary sentencing body must be able to sit in judgment of individual 
offenders and consider the individual circumstances of each offender. The legislature is 
plainly ill-suited for that role. 
 159. The minimum amount of time a defendant must serve before being eligible for 
parole varies by jurisdiction. For a few real-life examples, see Rhine et al., supra note 81, at 
292. 
 160. The parole board could still operate as a secondary value-giving institution, 
but only by introducing additional complexities into the institutional scheme. For example, a 
third institution could be given the authority to decide whether a departure was warranted. 
Assuming no departure was appropriate or authorized, the parole board would then decide 
when, after the minimum guideline sentence had been served, a defendant should be released. 
In effect, an offender would know the range of possible sentences at the initial sentencing 
hearing but would not know his or her specific sentence until the parole board made its 
ultimate decision. 
 161. In doing so, the two institutions operating together would roughly approximate 
the optimal sentence. This idea—that institutions can be combined in ways that promote 
overall social welfare—is hardly a novel concept. For example, James Wilson, a leading 
theorist of the founding generation, wrote about the importance of working institutions off 
each other. As he wrote,  
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Given this requirement, a judiciary would seem to be a more appealing 
choice as a secondary institution. Compared to the parole board, the judiciary is less 
prone to adopt a punitive orientation. Among other things, it possesses a degree of 
political insulation that allows it to resist the public’s punitive passions.162 
Delegating some sentencing power to judges, as a result, might ensure that the 
ultimate sentence is more closely aligned with the optimal result. 
This discussion suggests that a shared-sentencing system might make sense 
from a utilitarian perspective. The sentencing commission is the entity best able to 
serve as the primary sentencing institution. But a separate institution—the 
judiciary—would be useful in carrying out the secondary value-giving functions.163 
The result would be a system that comes close to reproducing most of the guideline 
structures in use today. 
This, of course, is not a definitive argument, and we need not take a stand 
here on whether a parole board or a court is the best candidate for wielding 
secondary power (or even whether a shared-power system is best). The fundamental 
point is that a utilitarian theory need not result in a sentencing system governed by 
a single institution. Whether policymakers establish a shared system or not, this 
Paper’s conclusion is the same: for the utilitarian, a sentencing commission should 
be the primary, if not the sole, sentencing institution.164 
                                                                                                            
“[I]n government, the perfection of the whole depends on the balance of the parts, 
and the balance of the parts consists in the independent exercise of their separate 
powers, and when their powers are separately exercised, then in their mutual 
influence and operation on one another . . . . They move, indeed, in a line of 
direction somewhat different from that, which each, acting by itself, would have 
taken; but, at the same time, in a line partaking of the natural direction of each, and 
formed out of the national directions of the whole—the true line of publick liberty 
and happiness.”  
1 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 708 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David 
Hall eds., 2007). 
 162. The issue is muddled, however, by the fact that the judiciary may be somewhat 
more likely to adopt a retributive orientation. See supra, Subsection I.C.2. Though this does 
not necessarily mean that the judiciary will react in an excessively punitive way, that is a 
danger in some situations. 
 163. Under this scheme, the sentencing commission would set the initial guideline 
range, and the judiciary would make decisions about whether departures are appropriate from 
that range (and, if not, where within the range the defendant’s sentence should fall). Further 
refinements in this approach might be considered as well. It certainly seems possible to 
include parole release in the structure, creating a three-institution structure. Cf. ALI 2003, 
supra note 23, at 57 n.69 (“One important issue for study in the Code revision process will 
be whether parole-release discretion ought to be retained, at least for some prisoners, and 
under what legal constraints.”). 
 164. Even if a sentencing-commission approach is morally justified, one might 
wonder whether it is legally permissible. In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional, on the grounds that binding 
guidelines violated the 6th Amendment and Due Process clauses of the Constitution. 543 U.S. 
220, 227 (2005). A common view today is that Booker creates an insuperable obstacle to the 
establishment of a sentencing commission with binding-rulemaking authority. As I will 
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CONCLUSION 
For nearly half a century, policymakers have engaged in a debate over the 
proper structure of the punishment system. Yet little agreement exists today over the 
optimal approach. To advance the debate, this Paper returns to first principles, 
asking a basic question: what punishment system is morally justified? The analysis 
presented here offers a first step in developing an answer. Relying on utilitarianism 
as the governing moral theory, the analysis suggests that a sentencing commission 
is the entity most committed to, and capable of, satisfying the moral theory’s 
demands. 
One might disagree with some of the empirical assumptions made in this 
Paper. Questioning those assumptions is entirely appropriate, and further research is 
unquestionably needed to ensure that the analysis is grounded in data rather than 
anecdote. Others might disagree with the analysis on a more fundamental level: they 
might reject the moral premise of utilitarianism. For these individuals, this Paper 
will hopefully spur exploration of the institutional ramifications of their own favored 
theory of morality. Indeed, the ultimate goal of this Paper goes beyond specific 
policy prescriptions. It is to promote a more transparent debate about the moral 
assumptions of institutional design, and to encourage individuals to be more 
reflective about the bases for their own institutional preferences in the criminal 
justice field. 
 
                                                                                                            
explain in more detail in a subsequent paper, this view is mistaken. My contention, in brief, 
is that the line of cases culminating in Booker cannot be justified in terms of traditional 
constitutional interpretive factors, such as text, tradition, or original intent. Rather, if this line 
of cases deserves fealty, it is because the decisions are consistent with fundamental moral 
principles. In this way, the moral argument presented in this Paper is relevant to deciding how 
to understand Booker and related cases. More specifically, Booker should be interpreted to 
undercut the validity of rules enacted by politically sensitive sentencing commissions—like 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission. It should not, however, be interpreted to undermine the 
rules established by properly structured, politically insulated commissions like the kind 
endorsed in this Paper. 
